

The Fluid, Multi-Scalar, and Contradictory Construction of Citizenship¹

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Citizenship has existed for nearly three millennia. Throughout its long history, it has been the main institution regulating membership in political communities and has provided the philosophical rationale and quotidian structure for the sociopolitical organization of societies and legitimate systems of governance.² In the twentieth century, the age of the nation-state, citizenship became the institutional building block of national membership and international relations. By the early twenty-first century, however, the everyday practices, as well as theoretical and legal meanings of citizenship had experienced considerable transformations. Most scholarly research has concluded that these changes have in great part been fueled by an intricate and intertwined host of global processes ranging from the hyper-mobility of capital and people to the introduction and use of universal rights, to the expansion of transnational grassroots networks. Ensuing academic debates on the implications of citizenship transformation have generated the emergence of multiple new types of citizenship, which are often used to represent contemporary changes. Urban, international, transnational, cosmopolitan, nested, global, and environmental are among the copious types of new citizenships recently coined by social scientists.

While it is useful to describe specific manifestations of contemporary sociopolitical membership, the labeling of such manifestations as different kinds of citizenship has limited analytical purchase. To be sure, descriptive labels (e.g., "urban citizenship") could become practical dictums around which political vindications could be articulated—such as the right to the city movement (see for example, Purcell, 2003; Tides Foundation, 2007). The low epistemological power of such labeling is due to the fact that it elevates particular dimensions of citizenship to the level of discrete 'types' separated from, or even opposed to, any general concept and everyday shared practices of citizenship. By doing so, this epistemic turn actually misconstrues the peculiar complexities of contemporary citizenship, assuming either its devaluation, erosion, withering away, or decomposition into multiple different types. I posit, instead, that the logic, practices, and meaning of contemporary citizenship have become pluri-dimensional, multi-scalar, and fluid. These features of citizenship result from grassroots practices and state policies, which are embedded in a rapidly changing and increasingly unequal world political economy dominated by a dual discourse centered on liberal democracy and market-fundamentalism.

One of the central arguments of this chapter is that instead of conceiving of contemporary citizenship as a totally new version of citizenship, we should see it as a sort of synthesis of the long history of citizenship as determined by three factors that have shaped citizenship since its inception in ancient Greece, namely: *scale*, *mobility*, and *inequality*. Today's citizenship is best conceived not as an assemblage of diverse and discrete 'types' of citizenships, nor as a hodgepodge of mono-scalar citizenships (e.g., global or urban). Rather, contemporary citizenship is a means of both multilevel membership and global control that recombines multiple geopolitical memberships that are related to different scales (i.e., local, translocal, national, regional, supranational, transnational). This recombination has been induced by increasing global mobility (most commonly capital investments and disinvestments, free trade,

international migration, and transnational grassroots engagement) in a global order characterized by historic levels of socioeconomic polarization.

While citizenship is fundamentally a mechanism of state control and rule, both analysts and activists tend to emphasize its role as a membership institution and thus see it as a ticket to gain access to rights and entitlements. This tendency, paradoxically, obscures the significance of today's citizenship as a governmentality tool (Foucault, 1988), behind which socioeconomic inequality is reproduced and maintained. By emphasizing rights and entitlements without addressing the power relations mediated by the institution of citizenship, activists and analysts have, however inadvertently, displaced the focus of their advocacy .

Scale, inequality, and mobility are the dimensions shaping citizenship as it is addressed here. I offer a *longue durée* overview of citizenship's history from ancient Greece to today's global system of nation states to analyze the dialectics of inclusion-exclusion and sociopolitical control of citizenship as it is structured by socioeconomic *inequality*, geopolitical *scale*, and people's spatial *mobility*. This examination will help us see how citizenship has historically been transformed to become what it is today: a key tool to govern under conditions of high global mobility and acute inequality.

My intention is to contribute to contemporary scholarly debates by casting a historically informed analytical light on current practices, legal redefinitions, and scholarly conceptualizations of citizenship. This should prove a useful endeavor, for most recent studies tend to be dominated by the dictatorship of the present—that is, the tendency to see present situations as being dictated solely by current conditions and detached from historical influences. Few recent studies of contemporary citizenship are historically informed. And when some historical concerns are included, often the historical framework goes back to periods as recent as the mid-twentieth or mid-nineteenth centuries, or, alternatively, it simply refers to ancient Greece (for significant exceptions see Baubock, 1994; Ignatieff, 1995; Pocock, 1995a). There is a strong penchant to privilege what is perceived as unique and to explore novel transformations in contemporary citizenship.

However, emphasizing the historical uniqueness of present conditions inevitably neglects historical continuities that could help us to gain a better understanding of the practical and theoretical implications of today's practices, formal definitions, and everyday meanings of citizenship. Many of the arguably novel practical and theoretical features of today's citizenship already emerged and waned earlier in history. Thus, rather than being historical ruptures, current changes represent the confluence, recombination, and effects of inequality, scale, and mobility, which are dimensions that have persistently shaped citizenship across time and space. This does not mean, however, that contemporary citizenship does not present features that are new or unprecedented. Rather, it means that incorporating the 'old' allows us a better grasp of the significance of the 'new' in today's reconfigured citizenship—and it could also help us formulate more nuanced predictions of the future.

The argument is divided into four sections. The first presents a brief summary of the current global context in which citizenship is being reconfigured and the academic debates generated by its transformation. This is followed by an historical overview of citizenship, which in turn is divided into three parts discussing, respectively, the relationship between citizenship and socioeconomic inequality, geopolitical scale, and human mobility. A case study that illustrates the way in which citizenship has become a dialectical double-edged tool of inclusion and exclusion, empowerment and rule operating at multiple scales will follow. Closing the argument is a general analytical discussion and conclusion addressing the practical and

theoretical implications of contemporary citizenship, particularly urban citizenship, in a globalized world.

The Contemporary Global Context

Scholars broadly agree that contemporary globalization has transformed practices and conventional understandings of national citizenship. Global processes include the increasing mobility of capital (Held and Kaya, 2007; Stiglitz, 2007) and labor (Castles and Miller, 2009; Jacobson, 1997; Soysal, 1994), the expansion of transnational grassroots and non-governmental activism (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005), and the consolidation of systems of governance with a planetary or regional reach (Jupille and Jolliff, 2011; Rosenau, 1997). People's global mobility, most especially labor migration, is consistently seen as a chief factor explaining the transformation of citizenship.³ International migration, given its absolute size, multidirectional patterns, and heterogeneous socio-cultural and national composition, has become the most visible global force transforming citizenship regimes throughout the world.

It is within this rapidly changing context that an intense scholarly debate on citizenship has emerged, particularly in European countries. Following the end of the Cold War and the formal establishment of the EU, many state members saw a steep increase in the arrival of foreign laborers and refugees fleeing conflicts nearby (e.g., in the former Yugoslavia) or farther away, especially from former colonies (e.g., from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America). This dual process of supranational integration and rising large-scale immigration has had an important impact on Europe's citizenship regimes and national identity. The United States also saw a dramatic increase in immigration pressures by a growing number of Latin American and Caribbean people displaced by the neoliberal storm sweeping their countries since the mid-1980s. The ensuing tightening of US borders, as a balloon effect, redirected many of those rejected by US immigration officers to the European continent (Castles and Miller, 2009; Guarnizo, 2009).

The contextual situation affecting citizenship in the global North became more complicated after the terrorist attacks in the United States on the morning of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent bombings of trains, buses, and airports in Spain (March 11, 2004) and the United Kingdom (London on July 7, 2005, and Glasgow on June 30, 2007). These and other similar attacks brought national security concerns into discussions about stricter immigrant and immigration policies and access to citizenship in the global North. These concerns fueled the approval of restrictionist policies at the supranational (i.e., the EU), national, and local levels. Such policies, including the militarization of international borders and the establishment of ever more stringent immigration controls curtailing the mobility rights of most people from the South, have severely limited or outright prohibited immigrants' access to social rights and restricted their path to naturalization. Moreover, rich countries drastically reduced the approval rate of asylum petitions to the point of rendering asylum seeking (until recently considered a sacred universal right) almost illegal (Flynn, 2004, 2005; Geddes, 2003; Guarnizo, 2009; Lewis and Neal, 2005).

How have countries of origin responded to the increasing emigration of their citizens, especially to the global North? How has this increased exodus affected national regimes of citizenship and social organization in labor-exporting southern countries? While strong restrictionist winds are sweeping across the global North, cosmopolitan breezes are crisscrossing the global South. In effect, many migrant-sending countries in the South are redefining

citizenship by expanding its territorial scale in order to incorporate their nationals abroad into new trans-territorial and even global national projects. Departing from the received principle that every person should have only one citizenship and one national identity as recommended by The Hague Convention of 1930, an increasing number of southern states have reformed their national constitutions to grant their citizens the freedom to acquire other citizenships without losing their original one (Faist and Kivisto, 2007; Guarnizo, Sanchez, and Roach, 1999; Herrera and Ramírez, 2008; Smith and Bakker, 2008; Smith, 2006; Yeshayahu Gonzales-Lara and Santome, 2007).⁴ In some cases, the reconfiguration of citizenship in the South has gone beyond just granting dual citizenship rights. For example, the new Ecuadorean constitution, approved in 2008, redefines Ecuadorean citizenship as universal citizenship (Gobierno Nacional de la República del Ecuador, 2008). According to the constitution, Ecuador "recognizes and guarantees to every person [...] [t]he right to freely transit across the national territory and choose his/her place of residence, as well as to freely enter and exit the country, according to the law" (Article 66). Moreover, the new constitution establishes that 'all the foreigners in the Ecuadorean territory will have the same rights and duties that Ecuadoreans have' (Article 9). It also recognizes that 'people have the right to migrate'; so the constitution determines that Ecuador will not 'identify nor will [it] consider any human being as illegal due to his/her migratory condition' (Article 40). These various reconfigurations of citizenship aimed at incorporating nationals abroad into their homeland's national project has resulted in, among other things, higher rates of naturalization of southern nationals in the North (Mazzolari, 2005).

How have scholars interpreted these transformations of citizenship? A very rich and complex body of literature has recently emerged addressing this question. The succinct review that follows is limited to the most influential contributions. Discussions on citizenship abound not only in academic circles, but also among politicians, policy-makers, grassroots activists, international migrants, and many other members of global civil society. This renaissance of citizenship has resulted in mounting confusion, as the term is often used to describe many disparate processes. It has come, variously, to mean:

the nationality indicated by a passport, participation rights in various public and private contexts, entitlement to benefits, commitment to a particular political or social order, [and] even decent behavior towards one's colleagues on university campuses (Fahrmeir, 2007).

Evidently, this calls for more rigorous analyses in order to keep citizenship a more precise and useful analytical category for understanding contemporary society.

Many scholars have undertaken this task. A significant result of these efforts has been the introduction of multiple 'types' of citizenship. Several common themes pervade these new typologies. Perhaps the most salient common feature is a concern with the *changing scale* under which citizenship seems to operate today. The newly labeled citizenships are based on the scale of the political community they tend to be associated with. The diverse types of citizenship fall onto a continuum that includes, in ascending size, urban and municipal (Purcell, 2003; Tides Foundation, 2007), national (Marshall, 1992), transnational (Smith and Bakker, 2008), regional (Faist, 2001), world, and cosmopolitan scales (Habermas, 1995; Held, 2010; Linklater, 1998). Some analysts declare with enthusiastic optimism that "The arrival of world citizenship is no longer merely a phantom. [...] State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum that already shows itself, at least, in outline form" (Habermas, 1995, p. 279). In a similar Kantian vein, David Held sees the global interconnectedness generated by the mobility of people and

capital as engendering a multilayered "political order of transparent and democratic cities and nations as well as of regions and global networks within an overarching framework of social justice." Accordingly, it is within such global political order that "the puzzling meaning of cosmopolitan or global citizenship became clearer." Fifteen years after Habermas, Held wishfully hopes that such global cosmopolitan governance will eventually materialize "even though now it seems remote!" (Held, 2010, pp. 178-181).

From a somewhat different perspective, Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal points to the extension of political rights to guest workers in Europe and argues that citizenship has moved up well beyond the scale of the nation state. "A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the postwar era," she argues; it is one that is "based on universal personhood rather than national belonging..." which thus "...[undermines] the national order of citizenship" (Soysal 1994, p. 1). She calls this model—which is "anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons' rights"—"postnational" (p. 3). The postnational citizenship argument, however, overlooks the racialized imaginary around which a common European identity is currently being constructed and the entrenched sociocultural marginalization and disempowerment this entails.

In this same vein, analysts like Bhabha (1990) go further, depicting global migrants as new nomads, as hybrid social actors whose identities have been freed from the siren calls of national identity formation promoted either by their countries of origin or state-centric discourses in their new destinations. Others seek to solve the apparent tension created by the construction of a citizenship that combines a large supranational scale (i.e., European citizenship, Andean citizenship) with a smaller scale (i.e., national and local citizenships). Thomas Faist, for example, introduces a concept of 'nested citizenship,' which, like a Russian doll, smoothly incorporates these separate scales into the new type of citizenship generated by the formation of the European Union (Faist, 2001). Still other analysts have dealt with the new recombination of scales generated by the responses of sending countries to increasing global mobility by introducing new types of citizenships, including transnational and translocal citizenships (Besserer, 1999). On the low end of the scalar continuum, revisiting the 'right to the city' concept introduced by the influential urban sociologist Henry Lefebvre (1973), some analysts and activists have introduced 'local' and 'urban' citizenship as inclusive responses to neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2008; Purcell, 2003; Smith, 2006). It is this mode of urban citizenship and its relationship to the practices of citizenship at wider scales that forms the central concern of the remainder of this essay and the core theme of this book.

This development of demands for local incorporation highlights a second common characteristic in the current literature on citizenship, namely a strong emphasis on *inclusion*, as represented by the rights associated with citizenship. This indicates a significant departure from classical citizenship, which almost exclusively focused on defining the ideal citizen and *his* civic obligations (at the time there were not active female citizens). The focus on inclusion seems to assume that by gaining formal inclusion in the political urban community, immigrants will automatically gain socioeconomic equality, overcoming their sociopolitical marginalization and economic exploitation.

A third common dimension of contemporary analyses of citizenship emphasizes the social construction and everyday practices of citizenship, rather than the political or legal construction of it. The tendency here is to privilege description over analysis, immediate experiences over larger, historically informed trends. Such empirical presentism leads analysts to end up labeling such practices as singular, novel processes departing from, or even standing in opposition to, historical trends, practices, and definitions of citizenship.

This leads me to the next dimension shared by many current analyses of citizenship, namely, the tendency to define citizenship practices in normative terms. By focusing on what appears to be new practices, scholars fall into the analytical trap that is inherent to sampling on the dependent variable. This methodological bias tends to blind analysts to instances in which the observed practice does not occur. Logically, such an approach leads the analyst to exaggerate the incidence and sociopolitical implications of the observed practice, which then may be perceived as a prevailing norm or as an outcome that can be reproduced in other places.

The analytical historical rupture is forming a new consensus according to which national citizenship is being eroded, devalued, or even made irrelevant, by a fragmented panoply of new, discrete types of citizenship operating at different scales. Some of these emerging citizenships are becoming effective symbols around which emerging grassroots movements seek to coalesce. However, as formulated, the analytical purchase of these new citizenships is often limited.

A consideration of the long past of citizenship will place in historical perspective the multi-scalar, fluid, and cyclical construction and reconstruction of the everyday and formal meanings and implications of citizenship. As we will see, this long-term historical turn is necessary because “citizenship” has become a conflated analytical homonym, which variously refers to political membership, cultural belonging, access to rights, and duties, as well as to heterogeneous everyday practices in social, political, civic, cultural, and economic domains.

Socioeconomic Inequality and Citizenship

From ancient Greece to the early 18th century, defining the ideal citizen and his duties were the main concerns in the analytical and political definition of citizenship. According to Plato, the perfect Athenian citizen was one ‘who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands’ (Plato, 1970, I.643). For him, the ultimate goal of citizenship was to produce a harmonious and stable polity. His disciple Aristotle, who actually was a foreigner, a non-citizen resident of Athens, went beyond Plato’s normative approach and analyzed the state and citizenship practices of his time. According to Aristotle, “[t]he citizen in [...] the strict sense is best defined by the one criterion, ‘a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office.’” (Aristotle 1952, 1274, b 32-6). For him, the citizen was endowed with the intelligence and rational capacity to decide about and pursue the common good through his active engagement as ruler. For Aristotle, the qualities and conditions of citizenship were given, not freely chosen; the citizen must be a free, native-born man whose parents were citizens, a patriarch, a warrior, and master of slaves.

Athenian citizenship was based on the separation between the *polis* (state) and the *oikos* (household), between the public and the private spheres. Citizens would discuss the affairs of the *polis*, not those of the *oikos*; issues of war and commerce, not those of household management. As such, the citizen was a *zoon politikon*, a rational political animal and the *polis* was the unique site for the development of his human capacities. The capacity to rule over things, slaves, women, temporary and permanent immigrants (*metics*), and their own fellow citizens made the citizen “the highest order of being [...] and it follows that rule over one’s equal is possible only where one’s equal rules over one” (Pocock, 1995b, p. 31). Citizenship equality included only a small minority and was based on the political exclusion of the vast majority.

Athenian citizens related directly to each other as equals, regardless of the size or quantity of their possessions—citizens’ property was taken for granted, not discussed. In Rome,

however, a person became a citizen through the combination of economic power and law; Romans became citizens through the possession of things and jurisprudence. Roman jurisprudence regulated and protected property and as such originated 'possessive individualism' before market supremacy took hold as the main mechanism of social stratification (Pocock, 1995b, p. 35). A citizen became a person free to act by law (*legalis homus*); in this sense, citizenship became a legal status. Legal citizenship status thus denotes membership in a community of shared law, which is not necessarily identical to a territorialized community. In contrast to citizenship in Greece, ancient Roman citizenship was as stratified as Roman society. Political participation, or 'ruling' as the Greeks would have it, was exclusively limited to male citizen members of the small Senatorial class. Female citizens, regardless of their class position, were not allowed to participate in politics (i.e., did not have voting rights) or take public office, although they were free to possess property and engage in economic, social, and cultural activities (Burns, 2007).

The 'classical' definition of citizenship unequivocally implies that only a very small number of human beings in the history of humankind have been in a position to realize their full humanity because they happen to be members of the kind of political community that uniquely gives play to their political human capacities. In Athens, it was precisely because of the political exclusion of women, slaves, and foreigners that the citizen minority was able to exercise its citizenship as a full-time activity; it is only in this way that citizens were able to develop and apply their 'human capacities' to rule. In Rome, the legal status of citizenship was possible because of the political exclusion of women, foreigners, and slaves. Here too, citizenship was not only a legal status vis-à-vis the state, but a tool in the hands of the state to govern.

In medieval Europe, influential analysts such as Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), regarded as the most famous defender of citizen liberties, were inspired by the ideal of civic virtue as practiced by the Romans and the Greeks. While he called for a new ethos of devotion to the political community sealed by a practice of collective self-rule and self-defense, his conception of the citizen-body remained staunchly patriarchal. Only beginning in 17th century England did citizenship start to be spoken of more in terms of rights than duties. This trend was consolidated by the mid-20th century.

A glance at the historical record reveals a close connection between citizenship and property. In Greece citizens were property owners. In fact, Aristotle insisted that property ownership be a precondition for citizenship. Throughout the centuries, the idea that citizens should be property owners has been persistently argued. It was only during the 20th century that this association was formally eliminated in most polities (Marshall 1992). According to the argument, a person (usually a man) without property would have neither freedom nor free time or resources to get involved in public affairs. More importantly, ownership of property would be indicative of 'virtue' since it represents strong abilities to rationally use skills and moral values to accumulate. A further moral justification claimed that a man with property would be less likely than a man without property to be bribed; thus he would be more able to govern well. For Locke, the propertied would be endowed with the right to preserve his life, liberty, and estate. During the Middle-Ages and in the city-states of the Renaissance, property and citizenship were two sides of the same coin, and in the late 18th century, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) declared that there was a virtuous relationship between "liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression."

These exclusive characteristics of the citizen remained the norm for over two millennia. Throughout the long history of citizenship, class, gender, immigration, and ethno-racial

categorization and stratification have always been central to its constitution. This formal understanding seems to be coming back not only among some anti-immigrant social segments, but also among politicians in local and sub-national governments in the global North today. In a way that is reminiscent of Aristotelian citizenship, some northern citizens and local governments argue that southern foreigners do not have what it takes to become citizens; this argument is often backed by either culturalist (i.e., ethnic) or racialized arguments, rather than by social or economic ones.

In the wake of World War II, T. H. Marshall argued that the equality of citizens before the state and the law could be constructed despite socioeconomic inequality in civil society (Marshall, 1992). Although Marshall sought to bridge this gap between political equality and social inequality, the disjuncture he identified, nevertheless, became the dominant normative definition of citizenship in the second half of the 20th century. Concomitantly, citizenship was conceived as legal membership in the national political community. The emphasis, then, was placed not on the exclusive characteristics of the ideal citizen and his duties, but on the inclusive rights and entitlements associated with citizenship. Citizenship, however, is certainly much more than membership, for it is a key instrument for the state's control, rule, and discipline over the national population. As such, citizenship determines the boundaries of everyday behavior and access to opportunities and societal rewards. In sum, citizenship has become a crucial instrument that bridges and legitimizes civic equality and social inequality and is used as a means of governing in a globalized world.

Historically, the definition and exercise of citizenship both as membership and as a ruling tool, has been shaped by, closely linked to, and dependent on the specific geopolitical scale of the polity. I turn now to an examination of this relationship.

Scale and Citizenship

Geographic scale refers to the socially constructed hierarchy of bounded spaces of different sizes, such as the local, regional, national, and global. Scale is not fixed, static, or given, but is a malleable and flexible political and social construction of place that is periodically transformed (Miller, 1994; Smith and Dennis, 1987). In this sense, scale is both the arena and outcome of contested social and political action (Weller, 2007). We can also understand scale in relational terms, as comprising dense networks of interpersonal and inter-institutional relationships that span and interpenetrate from the local to the global (Herod and Wright, 2002). Scale matters for understanding the changing nature of citizenship because social actors are agents engaged in social interactions that shape the spaces and institutions in which they interact. The power relations among social actors incessantly construct and re-construct scale. From this perspective, the arena in which contested political struggles are played out (i.e., the polity and the boundaries of citizenship) is as malleable as scale. This does not mean, however, that scale is just an epistemic, subjective dimension of social life. For in addition to this epistemic dimension, scale is also an ontological reality (Sayre, 2005): international borders and territories do exist and are enforced, no matter how porous they may be.

Scale has always been at the core of the normative definition and everyday experience of citizenship. So when analyzing citizenship, one of the first questions to ask is to what sociopolitical space does citizenship refer? More precisely, in what sociopolitical spaces are specific citizenship rights and duties (political, economic, social, and cultural) actually

applicable, achievable, redeemable, and enforceable? The issue is determining the scale of the state's jurisdiction at which citizens and non-citizens are subjected to its rule.

Most contemporary references to classical Greek citizenship see it as an ideal category but do not consider the issue of scale, which was fundamental for classical scholars such as Plato and Aristotle. Plato's ideal of the perfect state included a very specific size of the *polis*, namely, 5,040 citizen households (Plato, 1970). The actual number of Athenian citizens during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, however, is estimated to have been around 30,000 (a number which has to be multiplied several times to include all the women, children, slaves, and *metics* that formed the total population) (Heater, 2004, p. 26). For Aristotle, this was too big a *polis*. He argued that

[w]e cannot overlook the fact that such a number will require a territory of the size of Babylon or some such space which is similarly unlimited in extent. It will need all that to support 5,000 persons in idleness, especially when we reflect that they will be augmented by a crowd of women and attendants many times as great as themselves (Aristotle, 1952, 1265a 6).⁵

This concern with scale had to do with several central issues, including security against external enemies, self-sufficiency, and most especially political control over the population.

In ancient Greece, the state's ability to exercise control over the population was paramount. As such, this ability was closely related to the *polis*' scale. Aristotle, contrary to an apparently dominant view at the time, considered that "[a]ny object will lose its power of performing its function if it is either excessively small or of an excessive size" (Aristotle, 1952, 1326a 10). Size was crucial for governing, for in order for the state to rule well "the citizens of a state must know one another's character" (1326b 13). Moreover, if the state is too big and the population too large, immigrants could illegally abrogate the exclusivity of citizenship rights, for "[f]oreigners and resident aliens [*metics*] readily assume a share in the exercise of political rights: it is easy for them to go undetected among the crowd" (1326b 14).

Medieval municipal citizenship emerged in Europe following the urban revolution of the 12th century. Although in medieval Europe citizenship was of relatively marginal significance, when it was used, it was closely related to Aristotle's conception. In everyday practice, citizenship signified a privileged status in a city or a town, not in a large territorial state. Citizenship, then, was the assertion of juridical identification against the domination by, personal submission to, and identification with a lord rather than identification with a territory or community. In a way that is reminiscent of classical citizenship, the inhabitants of the newly liberated cities and villages "became both members and subjects at the same time" (Rigaudiere, 2002, p. 1). The citizen was thus seen as circumscribed to a specific city-state's "territorial and juridical space where he has elected to establish domicile and where he resides." Again, the scale of the polity is central to defining the space of citizenship. In this case, it was a space not only of juridical protection, but where power was exercised. Boundaries delimited the scale of the polity and, while being defined by the competitive powers surrounding the polity, they also "mark[ed] at the same time the frontiers of other citizenries" (p. 24). The bond inherently tying each new arrival to the other citizens implies not only accessing the common goods of the city (freedom, safety, 'securing his domicile'), but also assuming responsibilities (taxation, political participation). Although political participation remained optional, control over taxation connected to security and basic infrastructure of the city-state remained a central tool of municipal governance.

Overall, municipal citizenship flourished during the Medieval period due to a combination of factors, including its separation from the inhibitions and control of Christianity,

the strengthening of Roman law that gave citizenship its official legal status, and the liberation of cities and towns from the powerful control of the church and feudal lords who prevented the realization of civic freedom. Scale remained a key feature of both state and citizenship during this period.

By the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was a proud citizen of Geneva, a small city-republic of around 25,000 inhabitants, considered that a state must be neither too large nor too small in order to provide good government. In fact, he believed that Geneva represented the ideal size for a modern state, this despite the fact that it was a highly stratified society in which a small elite—around 5% of the total population—qualified as citizens with full political rights. He believed that the equality provided by citizenship was best achieved in a small, tight-knit community that was as large as his native Geneva. If a state was too large, he thought, people would develop little affection for rulers they never saw, which would in turn engender their alienation. He thought, as Aristotle did two millennia earlier, that too little land and too small a population would make the state vulnerable, unstable, and dependent upon its neighbors, and would soon give rise to internal conflicts and wars. Analysts' concern with the scale of the polity for defining citizenship was forgotten in later analyses as the normative size of the polity grew from city-state to nation-state. What remained, however, was the abstract meaning of citizenship as political membership.

The 1648 Westphalian model of political organization presupposes a unified, dominant, and central political authority that exercises supreme and autonomous governing power over a specific population living within the borders of a clearly demarcated national territory. Such territory is at the same time both the container of state power and the limit of the state's political jurisdiction. According to Marshall, the progressive evolution of citizenship rights were closely associated with freedom, so '[w]hen freedom became universal, citizenship grew from a local into a national institution' (Marshall, 1964, p. 84). While some analysts have doubted the historical dominance of the nation-state model, there is no doubt that it has been the dominant normative principle guiding global political and national organization for the last two centuries. However, questions of political boundaries and membership that had been settled at the national level are now contested. The efficacy and sovereignty of this system is now being challenged by increasing mobility, and promulgations and discourses of universal rights and transnational citizenship.

With the emergence of industrial capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, the world was drastically reconstructed, not only economically, but also socially and politically, as a global puzzle of national pieces. Until then, the world's geographical divisions had been highly non-uniform, ranging from ancient city-states to regional states, to fiefdoms, to provinces, to kingdoms, and to empires, each one often incorporating a distinct national group. The world today is more clearly divided than it ever has been before, and this has been done on the basis of a common scale: namely, the system of discrete nation states. (Smith and Dennis, 1987, p. 160). Preluding the rebirth of local/municipal citizenship in the early 21st century and reminiscent of Aristotle's concern with the size of the polis, by 1949, Marshall argued that trying 'to revive the sense of the personal obligation to work [in a form that it is] attached to the status of citizenship,' was not possible due to the scale of the national community, which he considered 'too large and remote to command this kind of loyalty.' The solution, he thought, 'lies in the development of more limited loyalties, to the local community and especially to the working group' (Marshall, 1964, pp. 130-131). Apparently, the tension between free market and worker's civic engagement required the rescaling of citizenship.

The granting, meaning, and reconfiguration of citizenship, as we have seen, are all very old processes that have affected society since antiquity. The intrinsic connections between geography and power, between space and state, and between territory and rights have existed as long as citizenship itself. The largest scale that citizenship has ever reached is associated with imperialism (one might consider the granting of “universal” citizenship by Rome in the 3rd century and by England in the 19th and early 20th centuries), yet through history the spatial limits of citizenship have varied from the local to the imperial to the national to the local and back again. For the sake of the present argument, it is important to keep in mind the relationship between local and universal citizenship, for, as we have discussed earlier, it should shed some light on current arguments related to post-national, cosmopolitan, and global citizenship – even though none of the proponents of these perspectives seem to be aware of the historical precedent.

The “universal” extension of citizenship can be related to current southern states’ discourses and grassroots practices of citizenship operating within a trans-territorial space that transcends, while at the same time is included within, different scales. Perhaps the most tangible consequence of increasing global human mobility today has been the sociocultural, economic, and geospatial reconfiguration of receiving Northern cities, as the vast majority of migrants from the global South settle there. Newcomers transform local systems of social inequality and stratification (Castles and Miller, 2009; Smith, 2001). In addition to transforming the ethno-racial composition of migrant-receiving cities, the newly arrived also help transform local labor markets, social and ethno-racial structures, and the local physical and sociocultural geography. Large-scale migration alters the spatial distribution of the population (via segregation as well as social networking), the everyday practices of cities (spatial concentration of businesses and use of public space), and the composition of local institutions and services such education, health care, and housing. These changes in turn have challenged receiving societies’ accepted representations of local and national identity and, more importantly for the present argument, the formal definitions of who belongs to the nation-state, who is and who is not a citizen, and who deserves to become one and who does not.

Historically, the city has been the epicenter of the construction and practice of citizenship. Today’s city is the quintessential place of global engagement (McNeill, 2002). It is the scale at which excluded migrants and their advocates and allies seek a particular form of justice: the scale in which excluded migrants and their advocates and allies seek *civic empowerment* as opposed to fair economic redistribution, via the granting of citizenship rights, a matter discussed throughout the case studies in this volume. The Right to the City movement, centered on the mobilization of urban or municipal citizenship, as these studies make clear, is a clear expression of this development (Purcell, 2003; Tides Foundation, 2007).

An integral element in the politics of creating places is the divergent understandings of contending constructions of scale and ideology that define social life and the normativity of how humans should relate to one another. These arguments have been complicated by the increasing mobility of people across and within national borders, a process that subverts one of the central tenets of classical citizenship: namely, that citizens are settled residents. What differences does scale make in a mobile world? The answer to this question is linked to conceptions of locality, identity, and the legitimacy of state rule. As we will see in the case study presented further below, the politics of scale involve the politics of interests and consciousness of mobile subjects, and they implicate the simultaneous intervention of different levels of state control (local, national, transnational, supranational) emanating from different countries. Finally, despite the multiple efforts by states to rule and control mobile populations, global mobility operating at

multiple scales creates alternative spaces of resistance and evasion, which migrants use to escape or bypass state control altogether.

Spatial Mobility and Citizenship

Historically, theorizing citizenship has been done from the perspective of the local residents, variously called natives, naturals, nationals, and subjects, in relation to the state as a way to exercise control and rule over a given, emplaced population. Normative definitions and analyses of citizenship have, almost exclusively, been constructed from this perspective. Discussions about the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of citizenship and the opportunities, rights, and obligations associated with it are framed, for the most part, in relation to the natives residing within the polity. When strangers, foreigners, or aliens are included in the analysis, they are seen in relation to their level of access to existing paths of socioeconomic incorporation, naturalization, and general accommodation as afforded to them by the state. In other words, rights associated with citizenship are geographically bounded to the scale of the polity, whether it is a city, a region, a nation, or an empire, and in relation to people's emplacement and displacement. The geography of rights such as equality, liberty, and democratic participation assumes that the subjects endowed with these rights are localized inhabitants rather than mobile subjects. In effect, mobility is seldom part of the discourse of citizenship rights; similarly, most analyses and definitions of citizenship seldom are constructed from the point of view of the outsider, the newly arrived, or the mobile denizen.

Yet, the foreigner has always been at the center of citizenship inclusion/exclusion. More generally, citizenship has closely been related to issues of residence (emplacement) and the ability to move freely into or out of a community. Usually, this construction has directly been linked to access to economic rights and political participation. Assigning limits to the access to local economic opportunities has constituted one of the most powerful mechanisms of control and disciplining, for it determines what kind of occupations and economic activities citizens and non-citizens can have access to. In ancient Greece, *metics*' economic participation was limited to be merchants. In the 17th and 18th century Spain, foreigners were not allowed to be merchants, for commerce was ruled as a exclusive domain of Spanish citizens (Herzog, 2003). The relationship between people's spatial mobility and citizenship rights remains effective in today's global nation-state system. In effect, differences in citizenship status between documented, undocumented, and national (i.e., citizen) workers differentiate labor market participants affecting their position in labor processes, but also allowing both employers and the state to control labor processes and workers (Thomas, 1982). Controlling people's mobility became one of the central concerns of the modern nation-state as a key mechanism of governing. Indeed, as John Torpey recently put it,

modern states, and the international state system of which they are a part, have expropriated from individuals and private entities the legitimate "means of movement," particularly, though by no means exclusively, across international boundaries. The result of this process has been to deprive people of the freedom to move across certain spaces and to render them dependent on states and the state system for the authorization to do so (Torpey, 1998, p. 239).

Part of the state's control over people's mobility relates to the connection between mobility and property and thus socioeconomic and political inclusion/exclusion; presently, for example, foreigners are not allowed to own certain types of businesses considered strategic for national

security or properties located in border areas in countries like Mexico and the United States. Concomitantly, the inability of certain mobile people to be able to own property, prevents them from not only improving their own lives, but from realizing their personal and human capabilities.

Multiple mobilities (Urry, 2007) are now understood to be central to the structuring of inequality within contemporary societies. Mobility has become a central factor shaping contemporary social structures as well as the relationship between state and society. As Bauman has put it:

Mobility climbs to the rank of the uppermost among the coveted values—and the freedom to move, perpetually a scarce and unequally distributed commodity, fast becomes the main stratifying factor of our late-modern or postmodern times (Bauman 1998, p. 2).

Evidently, citizenship is most significantly affected by these mobilities.

Global migration is a key manifestation of this mobility. In 2010 official estimates put the total number of international migrants at 214 million and that of forced international refugees at 16 million (UN Population Division, 2011). While the UN figures represent the largest absolute amount of international migrants ever registered, experts estimate that the actual figure could reach some 300 million. Yet, even this latter figure represents a very small fraction of the world's population (around 4 percent). However, the sociopolitical and economic impact of international migrants cannot be simply measured by their absolute size on the global scale. Rather, their impact should be measured in relative terms vis-à-vis the populations affected and in terms of the sociocultural, political, and economic effects their mobility engenders.

International migrants and refugees have dispersed across the world generating variegated effects at multiple scales. In a patterned manner, they have formed critical agglomerations in certain countries and places of reception, where they now represent a significant proportion of the population. The foreign-born have indeed reached high proportions in settler countries such as the United States (12.4 percent), Canada (18.8 percent), and Australia (23.9 percent), as well as in countries with a newer, yet strong, immigration history, such as Switzerland (22.9 percent), Germany (8.9 percent), and the UK (5.2 percent),⁶ and in the newest immigrant-receiving countries, such as Spain (12 percent)⁷ and Italy (6.5 percent).⁸ The transformative effects of migrants and refugees are especially noticeable in urban areas, where the vast majority of migrants tend to settle (Castles and Miller, 2009; Smith, 2001). The conspicuous presence of migrants from the global South in northern cities has triggered tangible effects in urban texture, labor markets, and identity, and more generally has impacted the meaning, definition, and enforcement of citizenship. By 2005, foreign-born people accounted for 36.5 percent of Miami's metropolitan residents and 29.5 percent of both San Francisco's and New York's. This proportion reached 42.6 percent in Hong Kong,⁹ 31 percent in Sydney, 27 percent in London, 18 percent in Paris (Migration Policy Institute, 2011), and 16.8 percent in Madrid (Comunidad de Madrid, 2011).

The spatial concentration of migrants in northern cities has introduced high levels of ethno-racial diversity, which has impinged on national discourses of national homogeneity and unity and has forced receiving states to further regulate access to the rights reserved exclusively to national citizens. Among the newest responses to the diversity and alienating effects of globalization and hypermobility has been the introduction of urban or municipal citizenship. In its new reincarnation, local citizenship seeks to incorporate and empower those segments of society that have been alienated, marginalized, or disposed of by global neoliberal processes: the

poor, the unemployed, the foreigner—regardless of their legal status vis-à-vis the national state. This move, proposed by some analysts as well as by urban political activists and even some local governments, apparently seeks to trump the role and power of national citizenship, jumping from the global to the local scale and dismissing the national scale in the process (Purcell, 2003; Tides Foundation, 2007). The rationale behind this move shares some common elements with urban and municipal citizenship of the past. It involves changing the scale of the polity as a subversive act against and as refuge from larger dominant powers, and it involves a dramatic increase of mobility from the countryside to the emerging urban centers. At the same time, however, the new urban/local turn is mostly informed by a combination of factors including the hypermobility of labor and capital, as well as the means of production, distribution, and representation. This answer—in the face of a global, borderless process that has worked contrary to the cosmopolitan integration that its proponents have trumpeted—appears to essentialize the local in the name of resisting the global. A closer, critical look at this approach, however, reveals serious epistemological and ontological limitations of urban/municipal citizenship as a viable answer to the present global predicament (Smith and Guarnizo, 2009).

Regardless of the factors motivating it (cultural, social, economic, or political), global human migration affects not only those who move, but also the institutions and societies in places of origin and reception, as well as those that are crisscrossed by the paths of mobility. Increasing global human mobility has significantly affected citizenship. But such effects have not always been direct, singular, and immediate. Rather, it has been a very complex and uneven process. Labor migration and refugee populations have had a significant impact on the allocation of rights to both natives and newcomers in the global North. From the outset, such re-allocation of rights has not been homogeneous and have resulted in a mix of inclusionary and exclusionary policies that often contradict each other.

Despite the latest anti-immigration concerns and controls, large-scale migration has become a structural process rather than a circumstantial event. For rich countries, relatively high levels of steady immigration flows are now indispensable for demographic reasons (to avoid population reductions) and for economic and fiscal reasons (to maintain national productivity levels and to support expanding retirement systems) (Boswell, 2003; Lewis and Neal, 2005). Immigrant labor has become fundamental for key economic sectors of northern countries' economies, which range from high tech to agriculture to construction to domestic work. Within this context, issues of membership have become increasingly complex and highly contested (Aleinikoff, 2002; Calavita, 2005).

It is not surprising then to find that responses to the influx of foreign residents are more intricate than simply restrictionist or inclusive, chauvinist or cosmopolitan. The national and supranational dialectics of inclusion/exclusion have gained particular intensity as they operate simultaneously at different geopolitical scales. For example, while national or even supranational policies seek to exclude immigrants, some places with significant foreign-born populations have introduced ordinances to grant local membership to people that would otherwise be considered 'illegal' residents or aliens. Meanwhile, other places have passed local ordinances imposing restrictions that are far more stringent than those existing at the national level.

In the United States, for example, cities such as San Francisco, Oakland, and New Haven have issued municipal identity cards to all their residents as a mechanism to incorporate their foreign residents, and they have instructed their police departments not to cooperate with federal migration authorities to persecute the undocumented (see DeStefano Jr., 2007; Oakland City

Council, 2007). On the other side of the political spectrum, many cities and states have passed draconian anti-immigration laws. In 2010, Arizona's state legislature introduced one of the most restrictionist of these bills, SB 1070, which makes it a misdemeanor for non-citizens to be in the state without proper documentation. This law also makes it a crime to shelter, hire, or transport undocumented immigrants and requires local police to check the immigration status of anyone suspected of being undocumented. Since then, a host of similarly crafted, and in many cases more extreme, bills have been proposed all over the country. As of this writing, at least 14 state legislatures had introduced bills similar to Arizona. These policies, however draconian, represent sub-national states' efforts to rule and discipline societal interaction via citizenship.

This inauspicious context forces southern nation states to respond in defense of their citizens abroad. Their responses, however, must be carefully calibrated because of their increasing macroeconomic dependency on their migrants' remittances and on their demand for national goods and services from abroad (Guarnizo, 2003; Ratha, 2003; Smith and Bakker, 2008). The responses of states of origin are also mediated by geopolitical considerations, as their nationals abroad have the potential to become political advocates for state interests before powerful foreign governments. This contradictory set of considerations has led labor exporting countries to implement a variegated array of constitutional reforms as well as programs and rhetorical expressions of inclusion that are designed in part to strategically position nationalist interests vis-à-vis the complex political and economic configurations presented by outmigration. The result has been the expansion and flexibilization of citizenship regimes in the South and the deployment of rhetorical discourses that encourage discipline and good behavior of emigrants as representatives of their nation abroad.

Policies of inclusion have also been recently introduced in European countries that have an old tradition of emigration, such as Spain and Italy. Here, nationals residing abroad have been granted not only the right to maintain their citizenship, but also voting rights and representation in national legislative bodies. These policies have helped to formalize migrants' membership ties to the state of origin and to facilitate the performance and expansion of transnational ties linking these populations to their homelands. So now it is not only migrants like Mexicans and Colombians who are authorized to engage in electoral processes in their respective homelands; overseas Spaniards and Italians can also participate in national elections even though they are thousands of miles away from 'home.'

Despite their inclusionary moves, structural and geopolitical constraints limit southern sending states' ability to deliver promised rights and special entitlements to their overseas populations. In this sense, citizenship reforms in the South end up being as mixed and contradictory as those put forth by their northern counterparts. Southern states have to be mindful of their own geopolitical positionality vis-à-vis the rich countries where their co-nationals—on whom, more often than not, they depend economically, politically, and even militarily—reside. Their responses are further complicated as national elites obstinately try to protect their privileged access to power and wealth, while simultaneously substantial proportions of their non-migrant population face poverty and exclusion within national borders and those living abroad undertake political practices and transmit social and political values that defy the existing *status quo* at home (Glick-Schiller and Faist, 2010; Guarnizo and Diaz, 1999; Levitt, 2001; Smith and Bakker, 2008). Dynamics are complicated yet again when nationals residing abroad try to exert oppositional political influence on national regimes in their homeland (Anderson, 1994).

The upsurge in the international mobility of labor from poor countries is strongly associated with the increasing inequality that is generated by the hypermobility of capital across the world. The evidence shows that capital mobility has significantly deepened global inequality, separating not only the South and the North at a global scale but also the rich from the poor at the national and local scales (Held and Kaya, 2007), which in turn induces specific patterns of mobility (Castles and Miller, 2009). Indeed, the evidence indicates that growing poverty and inequality is no longer confined to the global South, for it is also growing in the affluent North. More importantly, though, the explosive increase in labor migration from poor countries is exacerbating growing inequality in the North. Global migration is thus both a result of socioeconomic changes that increase inequality and a cause of its expansion and deepening.

Madrid at the Crossroads: A Case Study of Multi-Scalar, Fluid, and Contested Citizenship

At a recent two-day public meeting in Madrid, grassroots community leaders and high-level government officials exchanged arguments about public policy issues in a lively and heated discussion. The event was an example of contemporary engaged citizenship in action. While some participants asked officials to extend state services to their localities, others denounced recently introduced local laws for discriminating against their communities and demanded that the central government address their concerns. Specific petitions were formulated. Some leaders requested that new branches of the national vocational training service be created in their cities; others asked that a national subsidized loan program for small entrepreneurs be extended to their communities, while others proposed the creation of a new, inter-governmental program to help homeowners cope with the devastating effects of the current mortgage crisis.

While held in Spain, this apparently conventional meeting actually took place thousands of miles away from the country of origin of most of its participants. The petitions and proposals, couched in terms that bespeak the obvious obligations of the state toward its citizens, actually referred to the extension of official state services, programs, and protection to Colombian citizens residing on a different continent. Organized by the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations' *Colombia Nos Une Program* (CNUP), the meeting was held at an elegant hotel in an exclusive zone of Madrid in late November, 2009.¹⁰ The top leadership of the CNUP and members of the Colombian diplomatic corps in Spain, including the Colombian ambassador, were accompanied by high-ranking officials from various Colombian national agencies, including the National Technical Training Service (SENA) and the Colombian Bank for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Foreign Trade (BANCOLDEX). Representatives of the Spanish government and the director of the International Organization for Migrations (IOM) office in Colombia (which is the IOM's largest national office in the world) were also present.

The transnational inclusiveness being expressed in the debate suddenly changed when an official from the recently renamed Spanish Ministry of Labor and Immigration (formerly Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs) introduced the newly approved Assisted Voluntary Return Program (AVRP). The program, created after a European Union directive, is allegedly aimed at reducing some of the socioeconomic tensions generated by the global recession, which are particularly acute in the national labor and housing markets, by promoting the massive return of "extra-communitarian" migrants back to their countries of origin. This presentation provoked a bitter reaction among community leaders, who saw the program as the latest expression of official attempts to exclude the migrant (i.e., the non-European and, more often than not, non-white) population of the global South in violation of their human and citizenship rights. The

leaders' denunciation of the return program was accompanied by their petition to the Colombian government to intervene on their behalf.

The strong reaction against the Spanish AVRPP sharply contrasted with the leaders' enthusiastic response when, earlier in the meeting, the Colombian ambassador announced the signing of a bilateral agreement granting the right to Colombian citizens residing in Spain to vote in local Spanish elections.¹¹ While the AVRPP was seen as a blatant, unilateral act of national exclusion, this bilateral agreement was praised as a positive mechanism for facilitating local integration and as an official recognition of the historic ties linking both societies across the Atlantic. While the voluntary return program has been solely a European idea promoted by the IOM among extra-communitarians residing in Europe, as well as among their countries of origin, the local voting rights agreement was the result of bilateral Spanish-Colombian consultations that sought to promote '*una mayor participación social y política de los nacionales de ambos países en su lugar de residencia*' (emphasis added, *Acuerdo* 2009, p. 5590).¹²

The over 100 Colombian migrant leaders, originally from many different regions of their country, came to the event from every corner of Spain to represent their co-national migrant communities. The Colombian government paid the travel expenses of the majority of these leaders to participate in the event following an open call put forth by the Colombian Embassy. Most of these leaders were documented residents, many of whom were also naturalized Spanish citizens. As a direct result of recent national and supranational constitutional and political reforms, these naturalized Spanish citizens actually possessed multiple citizenship statuses since they also were European and Colombian citizens.¹³ So while most of the meeting centered on issues related to their relationship as Colombian citizens with the Colombian state, the participant leaders 'legitimized' their arguments by variously deploying their Colombian citizenship (i.e., "As Colombian citizens we have the right of...") or universalistic principles (i.e., "*No somos máquinas productivas, somos personas!*")¹⁴ or their Spanish or European citizenship (i.e., "As Spanish citizens, we...").

This event illustrates the fluid and contradictory construction of today's citizenship. The complex theoretical and practical implications of this process are multiple. What the participants saw as a normal way to relate to 'their' government seriously questions basic theoretical and political tenets of conventional national citizenship. This kind of citizenship practice is trans-territorial and multi-scalar. While it points out the continuous significance of citizenship as political membership associated with rights and entitlements, it also emphasizes the role of citizenship as a tool of simultaneous control by states ruling at different scales: the supranational European Union, the Colombian and Spanish national states, and the local state of the cities in which Colombians are now allowed to vote in municipal elections. Initially prompted by the increasing economic and sociopolitical importance of its international migrants, the Colombian and Spanish states have rapidly been accommodating its apparatuses at different scales to this new way of governing transnationally. To be sure, this case is not an exclusive Colombian or Spanish experience. As indicated earlier, many other national states of origin, which account for millions of international migrants, also have recently implemented similar, and even more far-reaching and complex, institutional arrangements (Guarnizo, 2009; Rodriguez, 2010; Salazar Parreñas, 2005; M. P. Smith & Bakker, 2008; R. C. Smith, 2006).

Some reforms, programs, and policies aimed at incorporating Colombians abroad into the national project date back to the early 1990s when the Colombian government adopted deep neoliberal reforms that, among other things, helped to trigger a historic exodus of Colombians to the global north as well as to neighboring countries. However, the most coherent and steady

initiatives in this direction started in 2003 when the CNUP was first created. Since then, the government has organized multiple events abroad and in Colombia that seek to open up new commercial channels for Colombian businesses to penetrate the market for "things Colombian" generated by co-nationals residing abroad; at the same time, the government has promoted the continuous and steady flow of migrant remittances and investments into migrants' homeland.¹⁵ This 'extractive' approach to the overseas population, since very recently, has included the extension of some social entitlements and state services to overseas nationals. In 2008, for example, a bilateral agreement signed between Colombia and Spain came into effect, allowing Colombians to transfer the pensions earned in either country to the place where they reside and to their descendants.¹⁶ That same year, SENA opened up its newest 'regional' branch—the first ever to be located outside Colombia—in Valencia.¹⁷ According to its director, at the time of the meeting, SENA Valencia had already granted some 1,200 diplomas to Colombian migrants and was also offering some courses in Madrid, Barcelona, and Alicante. Moreover, the institutional significance of Colombians residing abroad for the Colombian state was deepened in August 2009 when, for the first time ever, an integral migration policy was approved by the Colombian government. As part of this new policy, an interagency body was created in order to devise and implement programs aimed at the migrant Colombian population and their relatives still in the country. More interestingly, perhaps, is the fact that the new integral migration policy relates not only to Colombians residing abroad, but also to foreigners residing in Colombia; this dual consideration is part of what the government has presented as a symmetrical, balanced approach to provide rights, entitlements, and protection to mobile national and non-national populations. The Director of the CNUP officially presented this policy at the Madrid event.

This multi-scalar, fluid, and contradictory meeting-ground of citizenships in Madrid clearly illustrates the fluidity of citizenship boundaries, citizenry participation, and the applications of new governmentality techniques in the early 21st century.

Discussion and Conclusions

For the past three decades or so, global processes have drastically transformed received definitions and normative practices of citizenship. The century of the nation-state ended with what some scholars, informed by some of the biases of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002), called the crisis of citizenship. Alternative interpretations soon emerged identifying some particular dimensions or practices of citizenship as actually constituting a new set of citizenships. A different interpretation is offered here. Accordingly, the so-called crisis of citizenship is such only if we decided that citizenship refers only to membership in a singular political community. If this is the way we understand citizenship, then the institution is indeed in a very serious and lethal crisis. However, if we understand it not just as an institution granting membership, but as a way for the state, or states, to rule, control, and discipline individuals in particular and society in general, then citizenship *qua* citizenship is far from being in crisis. From this perspective, citizenship has been reconfigured as a multiscalar (as opposed to a singularly scaled) and fluid (as opposed to 'established') mechanism of governance resulting from dynamic and multifarious grassroots practices and state responses to a hypermobile global society. Overlapping scales of excluding, controlling and ruling dialectically intercept with new ways of belonging, participating, and resisting. These dialectic relations are often expressed by the exercise of substantial citizenship rights (including mobility) by people who have been nominally barred from having any formal rights.

Labeling the particular practices of contemporary citizenship that take place at different scales as discrete 'citizenships' is analogous to undertaking a topographical or external morphological analysis of a given complex process and then identifying each of its components as new and independent expressions that are separate from the whole. I argue instead that what is required to better understand contemporary citizenship is a deeper, historical analysis, as it were, that seeks to uncover its complexities as it operates *simultaneously* at multiple scales, crisscrossing formal political boundaries that range from the local to the national to the transnational to the global. Given its multiscalar character, legal reconfiguration, and new quotidian practices, today's citizenship has become more salient as a means for regulating, controlling, and disciplining, than it was as an institution whose role was to assign political membership and grant rights to people vis-à-vis a particular polity. Citizenship has become a crucial instrument in the constitution and reconstitution of place and rights (particularly the right to free movement and the free access to economic rights) and of the duties and limitations of foreigners. By so doing, it provides the legal argumentation that legitimizes discourses and practices establishing borders that separate those who are seen as deserving members from those who are seen as undeserving non-members, effectively normalizing the former by criminalizing the latter.

Having been displaced as a direct or indirect consequence of the increasing global mobility of capital, the global labor force from the global South encounter the everyday contradictory practice of citizenship exclusion; they are treated as undeserving of being granted national citizenship or any formal sociopolitical rights (i.e., "illegal aliens," "false refugees") while also being actively recruited and incorporated as a cheap and pliable structural resource that is fundamental for the stability and growth of the economy in receiving societies. Othered individuals tend to be granted some modicum of 'economic' citizenship as workers, though often such citizenship has no substantive legal counterpart. They are simply seen as workers, not citizens (Calavita, 2005). Yet because the relationship between governmentality and resistance is dialectical and citizenship is multi-scalar, cases of exclusion are often met by the novel initiatives of migrants promoting their political inclusion (as was illustrated in the case study above).

While migrants are often economically included and socio-politically excluded in the North, many are nevertheless included by states of origin (e.g., via dual and multiple citizenships), which seek to maintain the loyalty of their diaspora. As part of this effort, policies of long-distance national integration have been introduced by many national states (e.g., voting rights and co-development initiatives). A symbolic politics of inclusion has been accompanied by normative discourses of national identity and behavior as migrants are portrayed not only as heroes working hard to help their homeland, but as ideal citizen ambassadors of their nation abroad (Rodriguez, 2010; Smith and Bakker, 2008; Smith, 2006).

The inclusion of global migrants, however, is not only transnational; for local initiatives of inclusion are being spearheaded by grassroots movements, by local states, and even by national governments pursuing the wholesale inclusion of migrants (as demonstrated by the Spanish-Colombian agreement granting electoral rights to each country's respective citizens who legally reside in the other's territory and Ecuador's universal citizenship). Here we see how global mobility has reconfigured the everyday practices and legal understandings of citizenship, effectively recombining local, national, and transnational scales of belonging.

Contemporary citizenship, therefore, has, become a flexible, legitimate, and effective tool of global governmentality in the hands of states in a globalizing world.¹⁸ Furthermore,

citizenship refers not only to the way states rule, but also to the way in which individuals relate to each other (who is and who is not a citizen), define themselves ("I'm a citizen of such and such place/country"), and shape the conditions under which they are ruled wherever they are located. That is, citizenship operates at multiple spatial levels. This makes it possible for migrants and their organizations to exercise agency by finding access to the right legal/institutional articulations in a world where overlapping multi-scalar constructions are increasingly part of the social fabric.

Indeed, contemporary citizenship, as a hegemonic mechanism of sociopolitical power and control, discipline, and normative regulation, has dialectically created new opportunities for contestation, evasion, and creative resistance by those deemed unworthy to accede to it. A prime illustration of this resistance was the "Day Without Immigrants" that occurred on May 1, 2006. Millions of mostly Latino immigrants and their US supporters, in showing their opposition to draconian immigration reforms being discussed in the US Congress, skipped work and took to the streets; they flexed their economic muscle in a nationwide boycott that succeeded in slowing or shutting down many farms, factories, markets, and restaurants across the United States (Fox, 2010a; 2010b). While officially excluded from the right to possess formal political rights and even from the very right to move to the United States, millions of undocumented migrants publicly demonstrated that they could and indeed do have the ability to exercise substantial political rights. Migrants' public repudiation of their own criminalization by some sectors of US society showed how the very denial of citizenship rights creates dialectical spaces of resistance and, thus, inclusion of the excluded. Efficacy of the protest is not the primary intellectual concern here. Rather, it is important to recognize that citizenship, as a mechanism of discipline and control—of governmentality—thus dialectically engenders its opposition and resistance and demands for a reconfiguration of its content.

While global factors affect every world polity, the actual effects on citizenship are highly contingent on the specific local and historically determined conditions. These processes, while identifiable as discrete dimensions, are dialectically interrelated and affect each other in complex and dynamic ways. In that sense, I argue that the general premise about the transformative effect of globalization on citizenship must be qualified. In a multi-scalar world there is significant variation in the direction, scope, and depth of the transformation across national polities and localities. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to find significant historic continuities in the construction of citizenship. On the one hand, xenophobic, chauvinist movements use neo-Aristotelian arguments to justify the civic, political, and social exclusion of immigrants from the global South, who are only included as cheap and pliable workers undeserving to become citizens. On the other, progressive movements promote the inclusion of these immigrants into post-modern city-states under similar premises of freedom as the ones deployed four hundred years ago, although this time such liberating inclusion is justified by a neo-Kantian, cosmopolitan discourse. Assessment of the current and future consequences of globalization on citizenship must therefore be more circumspect in the elaboration of its analytical apparatus and aware of the present contingencies and historical continuities with which global processes are variously manifest in space, place, and time.

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² Citizenship has not been the only institutional form of sociopolitical membership and identity. Analytically, however, it is the only one that has historically been associated with notions of individual autonomy, equality of status, and political participation vis-à-vis the state.

³ Global human mobility includes not only economic migrants and refugees, but also tourists, business people, and other types of globetrotters who move across geographies at a faster pace and travel longer distances than ever before (Urry, 2007). For instance, the number of international tourists worldwide has reached record levels. By 2010, the total official number of international tourists reached almost 1 billion (935 million); this figure is up 58 million from 2009 and represents 22 million more than the peak level preceding the 2008 global financial crisis (UN World Tourism Organization, 2011).

⁴ The Hague Convention stated that "it is in the general interest of the international community to secure that all its members should recognize that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only." Moreover, "the ideal towards which the efforts of humanity should be directed in this domain is the abolition of all cases both of statelessness and of double nationality" (League of Nations, 1930).

⁵ Aristotle was thinking in terms of a general Greek *polis*, not just Athens. Most Greek city-states were rather small with an average territory of about 70 square miles. Athens was exceptionally large, having a territory of 1,000 square miles (see Aristotle, 1952, translator's comment, #1, p. 57).

⁶ Migration Policy Institute, Data Hub (Retrieved Mar 6, 2011, from <http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/northamerica.cfm>).

⁷ Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Retrieved Mar 6, 2011, from <http://www.ine.es/>).

⁸ Istituto Nazionale di Statistica. 2009. *Rapporto Annuale - La situazione del Paese nel 2008*. Sistema Statistico Nazionale. Rome.

⁹ According to UN Population Division estimates, the foreign-born in Hong Kong reached 2,998,686 in 2005 (UN Population Division. 2006. *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision*. POP/DB/MIG/Rev. 2005).

¹⁰ V Seminario Internacional de Colombia Nos Une, Madrid, November 28-29, 2009.

¹¹ Signed in January, 2009, this agreement entered into effect in January 2010. Local voting rights are granted to Colombian citizens who reside legally in Spain. In reciprocity, Colombia grants the same voting rights to documented Spanish citizens residing in Colombia (2009. "Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y la República de Colombia, sobre participación en las elecciones municipales de los nacionales de cada país residentes en el territorio del otro." Bulletin 18, § I. Pp. 5590-2. Spain: Boletín Oficial del Estado.

¹² 'A higher social and political participation of the nationals of both countries in their *place of residence*.'

¹³ The 1991 Colombian Constitution approved the right for Colombians to have more than one citizenship. According to Chapter I, Article 96, "*Ningún colombiano por nacimiento podrá ser privado de su nacionalidad. La calidad de nacional colombiano no se pierde por el hecho de adquirir otra nacionalidad.*" On the other hand, Spanish citizens, as members of a signatory state of the European Union's 1992 Maastricht Treaty, are also European citizens (1957. "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." pp. 47-199: Official Journal of the European Union (Eng.); 1992. "Maastricht Treaty." European Union.)

¹⁴ "We are not productive machines, we're human beings!"

¹⁵ The CNUP, for example, has organized, since its creation, dozens of so-called housing fairs to promote the sale of urban housing and lots among Colombians throughout the Colombian overseas geography, including in cities such as Madrid, New York, Miami, and London. It has also created several websites to promote business and communication among migrants abroad and between migrants and their homeland.

¹⁶ 2008. "Convenio de Seguridad Social entre el Reino de España y la República de Colombia."

¹⁷ The Valencia branch was opened in collaboration with the Universidad Politécnica de Valencia (UPV). The courses and graduation ceremonies are held on the UPV campus. While SENA Valencia offers some courses in other cities, Colombian leaders participating in the Madrid event wanted to have similar physical branches opened up in their own regions, as SENA has in Colombia. Technical training courses

in Spain are for Colombian citizens residing in Spain and who hold a high school diploma only (see <http://senavalencia.com>).

¹⁸ I use 'governmentality' as Foucault (1988, p. 19) defined it: "This contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality." This conception of governmentality reflects Marx's argument, according to which every production technique requires not only a modification in an individual's skills but also of their attitudes.