All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation Fear, Anti-Latino Affect, and Immigration

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In this article, we consider how the factors driving Anglo attitudes toward immigration changed in the post-9/11 era. We argue that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the immigration issue became nationalized, framed in a threat context. In this context, acculturation fear and anti-Latino sentiment are strong predictors of restrictionist sentiment; in the pre-9/11 period, these factors have little substantive impact on Anglo attitudes. We theorize that the current climate has helped “activate” social identities, which in turn has deleterious consequences for the Latinos in the United States. Using data from the 2000 and 2004 National Election Studies, we estimate a model of Anglo immigration attitudes. We show indicators of acculturation fear, anti-Latino sentiment, and media exposure significantly relate to Anglo immigration attitudes in the post-9/11 period but not the pre-9/11 period.

In Who Are We?, Huntington (2004) articulates concerns about acculturation and assimilation among Latino immigrants. Huntington (2004) contends that cultural nonassimilation among Latino migrants is bifurcating the United States into two separate cultures, which he argues, poses a substantial threat to America’s “national identity.” While the merits of Huntington’s argument have come under fire (Fraga and Segura 2006; Segura 2005) and the central claims he makes about cultural assimilation among Latinos seem flatly wrong (Citrin et al. 2007), we contend the basic features of his story are now paradigmatic of the way many Anglo-Americans view Latinos and the immigration issue more generally. Over the past two decades, the relationship between Anglos and Latinos has been marked with heightened levels of animus, often emanating from the debate over immigration. The language used to describe the immigration issue—invansion, porous border, illegal, etc.—explicitly creates a politics of division, an “us”, a “them.” We argue this poses a threat to Anglo-American cultural identity and core values, which has translated into negative characterizations of Latinos and restrictionist preferences towards immigration.

What has accelerated this bifurcation? We contend attention paid to the border, its connection to terrorism and immigration in the post-9/11 era have had profound consequences on the lens through which Anglos view immigration. The attacks have implications for intergroup attitudes in the United States, extending beyond anti-Muslim sentiment (Kam and Kinder 2007; Schildkraut 2002). Heightened sensitivity to group-based threats post-9/11, coupled with concerns over national identity promoted widespread antipathy towards Latinos based on perceptions the group violates traditional American values. This hostility towards Latinos has further promoted restrictionist positions on immigration and reflects the national emergence of a cultural dimension to the debate over immigration. Using survey data from 2000 and 2004, we show moral values and anti-Latino sentiment are strongly related to restrictionist immigration attitudes in the latter period. These factors have virtually no impact in the earlier period.¹

¹An online appendix for this article is available at http://journal.cambridge.org/jop containing supplemental analysis. Data and materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the paper will be made available by August 2011 at http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/bsjjones/data/JOP.
**Political Context**

Throughout most of the 1990s, the political battle lines of the immigration debate were largely drawn in states bordering Mexico. Within these states, pressure mounted among citizen-activists for local and state leaders to address issues posed by the increasingly large immigrant population. Indeed, in states with direct democracy procedures, citizens were able to bypass the legislature in establishing policy specifically targeting immigrant groups (Branton et al. 2007; Tolbert and Hero 2001). The political backlash against immigration was highly visible and for a time received considerable national exposure with the passage of several controversial ballot initiatives. Chief among the initiatives was California’s Proposition 187, which denied undocumented migrants access to social services such as nonemergency medical care. Further, activists outraged at the perceived “invasion” along the border organized border-watch groups in California, Arizona, and Texas. The groups, largely unnoticed outside the border region, received extensive coverage within the region. By the mid-2000s, citizen militia groups gained national attention, but these groups were firmly established by the late 1990s.

All the while, the Latino population was growing. In the 1980s, the in-migration of Latinos increased substantially and continued rising throughout the 1990s, a decade in which “Hispanic origin” population increased by nearly 60%, while the U.S. population increased by only 13%. The number of migrants arriving in the United States concomitantly increased, mostly from Latin American countries (but primarily Mexico). With respect to undocumented migration, the best estimates suggest that between 1992 and 2000, the size of this population increased by about 115% (Passel 2005). Furthermore, during the 1990s nonborder states experienced massive expansion of the Latino populations, particularly states in the south and southeast. Indeed, between 1990 and 2000 the Latino population in the South increased by over 71%. Further, the Latino population in six southern states (North Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Alabama) increased by over 200% between 1990 and 2000.

By the early 2000s, the “perfect storm” existed for anti-Latino backlash on the immigration issue. The increase in citizens of Hispanic origin as well as documented and undocumented migrants was substantial. As undocumented migration increased along the border, citizen groups emerged, gaining substantial publicity in U.S.-Mexico border states, but less attention outside this region. All that was needed to propel this issue to the national stage was a catalyst. We argue the terrorist attacks of 9/11 served that role.

In the aftermath of 9/11, political and media attention shifted to the border. Politicians, pundits, activists, and some academics linked looming security threats to immigration, particularly undocumented migration (cf. Ting 2006). In the months after the 9/11 attacks, widely publicized reports of apprehensions of individuals from “special interest” countries appeared in the media and some politicians went so far as to explicitly link migrants to terrorists (Bender 2003; Hall 2005; Lovato 2006). Regen (2010) argues the attacks led the Border Patrol to see “every economic refugee, every campesino and shopkeeper, as a potential terrorist” (xxvii). Indeed, images of José Padilla, an American citizen of Puerto Rican origin arrested in 2002 and convicted of aiding terrorists in 2007, were pervasive and served as an explicit coupling between Hispanics and the terror threat (Bender 2003; NAHJ 2003).3

As a result, the hostility toward immigration, especially undocumented migration readily seen in the border states in the 1990s, has percolated throughout the country in the post-9/11 era. Indicative of this nationalization, media coverage of immigration and the border jumped to a new “equilibrium.” Consider Table 1. Using Newsbank, we selected seven newspapers and counted the number of articles (including editorials) per year referencing the “border” and “immigration,” and the combination of these terms with “national security” and “terrorism.” The time-frame of this analysis goes from 1996 to 2005. Three of the seven newspapers were from border states of Arizona (Arizona Daily Star) and California (San Diego Tribune; Sacramento Bee). Two of the papers were regional, non-Mexican border state papers (Charlotte Observer; Minneapolis Star Tribune), and two were papers of national record (New York Times; Washington Post).

Table 1 gives difference-in-means tests for pre-versus post-9/11 volume of coverage in the selected newspapers.4 The unit of analysis is the mean of the

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3Padilla was usually also referenced by his Muslim name, Abdullah al-Muhajir in the myriad of stories on his arrest and trial (NAHJ 2003). Further, according to the NAHJ (2003) nearly 20 percent of all news involving Hispanics in 2002 was devoted to José Padilla.

4For a graphical presentation of media coverage of immigration, see the online appendix.
yearly counts of coverage between 1996 and 2000 versus the mean for the period 2001 to 2005. The top portion of Table 1 gives the $t$-tests for the non-Mexican border state papers, the bottom portion the tests for Mexican border state papers. Two results are of interest. The overall volume of coverage in the selected California and Arizona newspapers did not appreciably increase in the post-9/11 period. Indeed, consistent with our argument, immigration is a perpetually salient issue in these regions: coverage is consistently high, invariant to time. However, outside this region, media coverage of immigration fundamentally reequilibrated. For example, in the years prior to the attacks, both the New York Times and the Washington Post published around 55 articles; in the latter period, the average jumps to over 100. Similar remarks apply for the Observer and the Star Tribune.

Yet, not only did the volume of coverage increase, but the content became predominantly negative. In the post-9/11 era, this coverage has implicitly and explicitly associated Latino immigration with national security, crime, and cultural change. Indeed, the National Association of Hispanic Journalists (NAHJ) “Network Brownout 2003” report\(^5\) states that in the year following 9/11, sixty six percent of network coverage of Latinos involved crime, terrorism, and illegal immigration. Network news generally portrays Latinos as “a dysfunctional underclass that exists on the fringes of mainstream U.S. society” (NAHJ 2003, 3). Further, in the coverage of illegal immigration, Latinos are portrayed as a “threat to the country.” Even more critical, a report by Media Matters Action Network (MMAN) finds that “cable news overflows not just with vitriol, but also with a series of myths that feed viewers’ resentment and fears, seemingly geared toward creating anti-immigrant hysteria” (MMAN 2008, 2).

This increased nation-wide media attention given to immigration coincided with a change in mass opinion. Polling data reveals substantial shifts in opinion on immigration following the 9/11 attacks. For example, Gallup polls conducted between 1999 and 2005 show a sharp increase in the percentage of Americans supporting more restrictive immigration levels immediately after September 11 (see Figure 1). The dots on the plot give the actual Gallup percentages for those responding in the categories

\(^5\)Although here we focus on the 2003 Brownout Report, the subsequent reports also lend similar evidence on network news coverage of Latinos and immigration.

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**Table 1** Border and Immigration-Related Stories in Selected Newspapers, Pre- and Post-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1996–2000 Mean (s.d.)</th>
<th>2001–2005 Mean (s.d.)</th>
<th>$t$-test$^+$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Mexican Border States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte Observer</td>
<td>19.8 (3.54)</td>
<td>39.4 (4.18)</td>
<td>3.58 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis Star Tribune</td>
<td>7.2 (.73)</td>
<td>21 (4.68)</td>
<td>2.91 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>54.4 (10.69)</td>
<td>110.8 (8.79)</td>
<td>4.08 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>55.8 (7.70)</td>
<td>102.6 (2.29)</td>
<td>5.82 (.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexican Border States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona Daily Star</td>
<td>96.2 (14.67)</td>
<td>128.4 (12.69)</td>
<td>1.66 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento Bee</td>
<td>30.6 (9.21)</td>
<td>41 (7.01)</td>
<td>.90 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego Tribune</td>
<td>140.2 (25.6)</td>
<td>179.4 (53.4)</td>
<td>1.48 (.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $^+$ $t$-test is one-tailed test of $\bar{X}_{2001} - \bar{X}_{2000}$. Newspaper counts come from an analysis of the Newsbank archive. The search terms “border” and “immigration” were used in the Newsbank analysis.

**Figure 1** Preferred Immigration Levels

![Graph showing changes in immigration levels from 1999 to 2005](image-url)
“decrease,” “keep the same,” and “increase” levels of immigration. A kernel density smoother is overlaid to help visualize trends; the top line is the smoothed values for “decrease” levels, the middle line is for “keep the same,” and the bottom line is for “increase” levels. From the Gallup survey administered in June 2001 to one taken in October 2001, restrictionist sentiment on the immigration issue increased by about 17%. This upward shift in restrictionist sentiment remained more-or-less intact through 2005. As another indicator of mass opinion on the issue, a report by the Pew Research Center demonstrates a comparable shift in public mood. Comparison of the Political Values Project surveys conducted in 1999 and 2002 suggests opposition to immigration increased following the attacks. The percentage of Americans who believe “we should restrict and control people coming into our country to live more than we do now” increased from 72% in 1999 to 80% in 2002. Beyond this, the intensity of opposition has increased. The percentage of Americans who indicated they completely agree with this statement rose from 38% in 1999 to 49% in 2002 (PEW 2003).

Taken together, newspaper coverage and public opinion polls point to the heightened salience of the immigration debate following the 9/11 attacks. A variety of factors might account for this shift. Historically, mass support for immigration has fluctuated widely in response to an interplay of cultural and economic considerations (Ngai 2004). The events of 9/11 shattered the public’s sense of security, damaged the national economy, and made salient a clash of cultures by introducing the concept of jihad into the public consciousness—thus potentially activating opposition along all three dimensions. While security and economic concerns are operating in this context, we are fundamentally concerned here with the cultural or symbolic mechanism underlying restrictionist preferences. We argue 9/11 stimulated an identity-based conflict over some of the more contested (and nativist) elements of American national identity. This symbolic conflict activated or perhaps magnified Anglo hostilities towards a variety of marginalized social groups—including Latinos—resulting in heightened opposition to immigration. In order to better understand the mechanism underlying this conflict we draw on insights from social identity theory.

**Theory**

The 9/11 attacks elicited an immediate and seemingly pervasive increase in expressions of national identificiation and national unity (Li and Brewer 2004). The more positive, patriotic expressions of national identity were ubiquitous (Skitka 2005). For example, approximately three-quarters of Americans reported displaying an American flag following the attacks (Moore 2003). Alternatively, there was evidence of heightened intolerance towards Muslims, especially among those who felt a threat to national security was high and persistent. For example, Huddy et al. (2005) found threat perceptions after the 9/11 attacks were strongly related to stereotyping Arabs, support for retaliatory action, and support for limiting civil liberties. Davis and Silver (2004) also found that individuals’ sense of threat was generally related to a willingness to forgo civil liberties, though this effect was conditional on trust-in-government.

Based on this research, we expect the cultural dimension of immigration attitudes can be understood as a kind of national identity politics (Huddy and Khatib 2007). A heightened sense of threat post-9/11, coupled with exposure to nationalist themes, may have activated latent ascriptive beliefs regarding a white, Christian, native-born America (Li and Brewer 2004; Schildkraut 2002). This more restricted conceptualization of American identity, coupled with a strengthened adherence to traditional values in a time of national crisis, provided the basis for amplified hostilities towards not only Muslims, but also Latinos. This animosity translated into preferences for stringent immigration policy following the 9/11 attacks.

These more negative expressions of national identity are commonly referred to as nationalist or nativist sentiments, in contrast to the aforementioned expressions of patriotism. Nativism is strongly related to both authoritarian values and expressions of intolerance (Li and Brewer 2004; Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001). In addition, nationalism and nativism are associated with a set of ascriptive beliefs corresponding to a very narrow definition of American identity. These beliefs reflect a characterization of Americans as Anglo, Christian, English speaking, and native born (Li and Brewer 2004). Such ascriptive beliefs reflect contested aspects of American identity rooted in traditional values and historical patterns of social and political inequality.

The expression of nativist tendencies in the post-9/11 era are documented by Kam and Kinder (2007). The authors compare opinion data from 2000 and 2002, showing that ethnocentrism is activated in the latter period and exerts a significant influence on attitudes in a variety of policy areas. This ethnocentrism reflects a generalized distrust or antipathy towards outgroups and is shown to influence both...
foreign and domestic policy attitudes. Consistent with this work, we investigate whether the activation of these latent ascriptive norms, coupled with a sensitivity to group-based threat in the aftermath of 9/11, has direct implications for public opinion regarding immigration. Although, we diverge from Kam and Kinder (2007) in that we focus on a specific argument about attitudes towards Latinos only in reference to one policy domain—immigration.

Huddy and Khatib (2007) argue national identity, its expressions and consequences—whether positive or negative—can best be understood from a social identity theory framework. Social identity theory posits the self is composed of two distinct parts, the individual identity and the social identity. One’s social identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978, 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979). According to this perspective, the psychological drive to maintain a positive social (or group) identity produces a number of predictable intergroup biases designed to improve or maintain the group’s economic status or symbolic authority relative to that of other social groups.

One of the most consistent findings in the social identity literature is the expression of in-group favoritism in intergroup contexts (e.g. Brown 1995; Huddy 2001). While expressing favoritism towards one’s own group is pervasive, bias towards other groups—in the form of hostility, prejudice, and punitive behaviors—is not automatic and emerges only when intergroup competition, conflict, or threat is salient (Brewer 2001; Brown 2000; Flippen et al. 1996). Group conflict can focus on either tangible or symbolic group interests. For example, perceptions of zero-sum conflict over scarce economic resources are strongly related to restrictions on immigration in both the United States and Canada (Esses et al. 2001). However, Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) find symbolic threats, particularly unwillingness to acculturate, consistently trump economic threat in terms of explaining opposition towards immigration and antipathy towards immigrant groups. This idea of symbolic group threat is also found in work on symbolic racism, which links racial animosity to perceptions that African-Americans violate fundamental American values, such as self-reliance, individualism, and the Protestant work ethic (e.g. Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder and Sander, 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Henry 2005). This idea is also mirrored in Huntington’s characteriza-

6For example, in 2006 the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania passed the “Illegal Immigration Relief Act,” which barred undocumented migrants from working or renting homes. At the state level, in 2007, 240 pieces of legislation related to immigrants were passed in 46 states (Hegen 2008).
being “overrun” by an “army” of “illegals” became more and more pervasive nationally in the aftermath of 9/11. Even Huntington (2004) speculated about Hispanic reconquista and the threat posed to Anglo values by the expanding Latino population. And all the while, the Latino population, particularly the undocumented Latino population, is on the rise, spreading far beyond the southern border. And so in a threat context we observe the following: a growing population of non-English speakers coming from countries with cultures putatively different from Anglo-American culture; a group perceived of as “invaders,” many of whom are “illegal”; a group tethered to a security threat; and a media offering extensive coverage of all of this, following elite-driven negative frames. We contend that for many Anglos, this context created an identity threat, an activation of “us” versus “them.” In a post-9/11 era characterized by concerns over not just security but also cultural threat, conditions were ripe for out-group stereotyping and intergroup animosities with respect to the immigration issue.

**Hypotheses**

Our expectations regarding the changing dynamics of Anglo attitudes on immigration are derived from social identity theory. This theory of intergroup relationship suggests the salience of group identities coupled with explicit group based threats—either symbolic or realistic—will produce antipathy. The 9/11 terror attacks served to heighten the salience of national identity, while concurrently activating ascriptive or nativist beliefs. Changes in the immigration debate emphasized the threat immigrants pose to these more ascriptive aspects of American culture. We expect such symbolic threats likely resonate most with Anglos who adhere to traditional values and express resistance to social change. In addition, we anticipate cultural or values-based threat also serves to reinforce negative stereotypes of Latinos, captured here by trait attributions. Specifically, we focus on perceptions that Latinos are trustworthy, intelligent, and hard working.

Anglos who make negative trait attributions—perceiving Latinos as violating this core aspect of the American ethos—likely favor heightened restrictions on immigration. This argument is consistent with both the symbolic racism perspective and Huntington’s notion of acculturation fear among members of the mass public. Anglo attitudes towards Latinos parallel attitudes towards African Americans in the sense that antagonism is derived primarily from concerns regarding violations of core American values. Given the heightened salience of national identity and associated ascriptive norms following the 9/11 attacks, we anticipate cultural traditionalism and negative trait attributions of Latinos will correspond to preferences for a reduction in immigration in the post-9/11 period to a greater extent than the pre-9/11 period. Explicitly stated:

\[ H1: \text{The effect of cultural traditionalism on immigration attitudes is amplified in the post-9/11 era.} \]

\[ H2: \text{The effect of negative trait attributions on immigration attitudes is increased in the post-9/11 era.} \]

Additionally, if our argument is accurate, and threat perceptions are so closely linked to media framing of the threats posed by immigration, then individuals’ level of media exposure should be strongly related to restrictionist attitudes in the post-9/11 period.

\[ H3: \text{The effect of media exposure on immigration attitudes is stronger in the post-9/11 era compared to the earlier period.} \]

**Data and Analysis**

To test these hypotheses, we rely on survey data from the pre- and post-9/11 era. Specifically, we examine Anglo respondents from the 2000 and 2004 National Election Studies. These studies are ideally suited to our needs as they ask a comparable set of questions on a variety of indicators referencing immigration attitudes, ingroup/outgroup judgements, cultural values, Latino trait judgements, and media consumption. The response variable used in the analyses is a 5-point scale measuring respondent attitudes toward levels of immigration. Specifically, the respondent was asked “whether the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?” The scale is scored such that “5” denotes “decreased a lot” and “1” denotes “increased a lot.” This item is comparable to that used in Citrin et al. (1997). As found by Citrin et al.

\[ \text{This survey item does not explicitly reference Latino immigration or “illegal” immigration. Unfortunately, there are no survey items across the different time periods explicitly asking about “illegal” immigration. We do not view this item as problematic in large part because the immigration issue has become inexorably tied to both documented and undocumented migration.} \]
(1997), restrictionist attitudes are much more prevalent than “openist” attitudes. About 46% of respondents score in the highest (restrictionist) two categories on the response variable, while 10% score in the lowest (openist) two categories on the response variable.

We argue that the threat context that existed in the post-9/11 era exacerbated acculturation fear or values-based threat among many Anglos. As a result, we expect restrictionist immigration attitudes to be driven by outgroup bias and concerns about preserving the extant cultural order. To measure this latter concept, we use a four-item Moral Traditionalism scale originally designed by Conover and Feldman (1999; see also Conover 1988). The items used to compile this scale ask respondents about adjusting “our view of moral behavior”; the extent to which “newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society”; the degree to which we “should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own”; and the belief that the “country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.” Conover (1988) notes this scale taps an individual’s “preference for traditional patterns of family and social organization that reflects an underlying reverence for the past and a resistance to change” (992–93). Each of the four items are Likert-scored. The scale is coded to range from “0” to “1” with higher scores corresponding to high moral traditionalism or a strong preference for maintaining traditional cultural norms and values. The Cronbach’s α for this scale is .68 for the 2000 sample and .71 in 2004. If our theoretical expectations hold, we expect to find a positive relationship between this scale and restrictionist attitudes toward immigration in 2004 but not in 2000.8

Coupled with value threat posed by acculturation fear, our theory predicts that outgroup stereotyping should be more readily observed in the later versus earlier period. For indicators of outgroup bias, we rely on a series of survey items asking Anglo respondents to elicit trait judgements of Hispanics. Specifically, respondents were asked to what extent they felt Hispanics were “trustworthy,” “hardworking,” and “intelligent.” Responses for each item were on a 7-point scale (anchored with 1 = trustworthy and 7 = untrustworthy, for example). We used these responses to create a three-item Hispanic Traits scale (α = .74) rescaled to be 0 (those with the most favorable Hispanic trait judgements) to 1 (those with the least favorable trait judgements). As a second way to measure ingroup/outgroup judgement, we use the traditional NES “feeling thermometer” scales for “whites” and for “Hispanics.” To account for ingroup desirability and outgroup bias, we took the difference between the feeling thermometer for whites and for Hispanics, producing a difference score of −100 to 100. We rescaled the variable to fall in the range −1 to 1. Here, a score of “1” would imply the Anglo respondent most favorably evaluated the group “whites” and least favorably evaluated the group “Hispanics.” A score of “−1” implies the opposite. The mean and standard deviations for this variable are .09 and .193 in 2000 and .07 and .20 in 2004. We hypothesize this covariate, called Group Evaluation, should be positively related to restrictionist attitudes: as ingroup desirability increases relative to outgroup undesirability, preferences for restrictionist attitudes should increase. As noted, Citrin et al. (1997) found this covariate to strongly predict restrictionist attitudes in the early 1990s.

We argue the amount of media attention to the issue of immigration and the frames employed conveyed various forms of threat posed by immi-

8Although this scale does not explicitly measure threat to the American way of life, it does measure preferences for preserving the cultural status quo.

9To test whether attitudes toward immigration are a result of outgroup affect more generally, we estimated the model including the black and Asian American evaluations. The results are presented in the online appendix.
As the evaluation becomes increasingly negative, we predict more restrictionist immigration attitudes. We again rescale the item (1 = Economy has gotten much better, 5 = Economy has gotten much worse) to a 0 to 1 interval. The item is referred to as Economic Retrospection in the tables.

In addition to these covariates, we include individual-level covariates measuring egalitarian values, ideology, education, and income. Individually held values like belief in equality have been found to predict racial attitudes (see especially Feldman 1988 and Hurwitz and Peffley 1992). Indeed, Pantoja (2006) finds that individuals demonstrating more egalitarian beliefs are more supportive of increasing immigration levels and more supportive of immigrant eligibility for welfare than individuals who are less egalitarian.

To measure Egalitarianism, we use an NES scale consisting of six items. Each item asks whether or not the respondent strongly disagrees, disagrees somewhat, neither agrees nor disagrees, agrees somewhat, or strongly agrees with a statement.\(^\text{10}\) We coded the questions so that lower values correspond to higher levels of egalitarianism. After creating an additive scale from these six questions that ranged from 6 (most egalitarian) to 30 (least egalitarian), we again rescaled the measure to range from 0 to 1. The measure has a mean and standard deviation of .53 and .16 in 2000, and .52 and .15 in 2004.

Some research indicates that individuals with a liberal ideology are less likely to support restrictive immigration policy than are individuals with a conservative ideology (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997, 1998). To measure respondent ideology, we use the 7-point self-report NES question. We rescale so that −1 is extremely liberal and 1 is extremely conservative. Each respondent’s level of education is measured using a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (eight years of education or less) to 7 (advanced degree). The respondent’s income is measured with a 22-point scale in 2000 and a 23-point scale in 2004 with higher values reflecting higher levels of income. Although research offers mixed evidence regarding the relationship between income and education and immigration attitudes (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997, 1998) we propose that after controlling for the values scales, ideology, and economic evaluations, respondents having higher socio-economic status (i.e., higher levels of income and education) will be less likely to offer restrictionist opinions on the immigration than when compared to lower SES respondents.

Finally, to test for contextual effects, we include as a covariate the percentage of foreign born Latino (Percent Foreign Born).\(^\text{11}\) Also, a binary indicator is coded “1” if a respondent resides in California, Texas, Arizona, or New Mexico and “0” otherwise (Southern Border). Finally, the models include a statistical interaction between the southern Border measure and the foreign born Latino measure to test for any population exposure effects (Foreign Born × Border).

Because the central hypotheses relate to differences in estimated coefficients between the 2000 and 2004 samples, the NES samples from 2000 and 2004 were pooled. A dummy variable was created and scored “1” if the sample year was 2000 and “0” otherwise. Then, each covariate discussed above was interacted with this time indicator. The basic form of the model is

\[
Y^* = \beta_0 x_i + \beta(D = 2000) + \beta [x_i \times (D = 2000)],
\]

where “D = 2000” denotes the dummy variable. This strategy allows us to estimate “separate” models for each sample year while simultaneously pooling the samples. As such, it permits a direct test of statistical significance between the sample years.\(^\text{12}\) To estimate the coefficients, a proportional odds (i.e., ordered logit) model was initially applied followed by a test of proportionality (Brant 1990). For some covariates (discussed below), the regression parameters exhibited nonproportionality and so a restricted partial proportional odds model was applied (Peterson and Harrell 1990; Williams 2006). The model, similar to a proportional odds model, is given by

\[
\log \left[ \frac{\Pr(Y \leq j \mid x)}{\Pr(Y > j \mid x)} \right] = \alpha_j + x' \beta + z' \zeta_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, j - 1,
\]

\(^{10}\)The statements are: “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.” “One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance.” “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.” “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.” “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.” “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.”

\(^{11}\)The foreign born Latino measure ranges from .13 to 14.55% with a mean of 4.94. We tried different specifications of population variables (i.e., percent Latino, change in the percent, etc.) and the results were consistent with those presented here.

\(^{12}\)A separate models approach could be taken here; however, a stand-alone model for each sample does not allow a direct test of $\beta_{2000} = \beta_{2004}$, which is the test needed here.
and has two sets of parameter estimates, \( \beta \) and \( \xi_j \). The \( \beta \) are the coefficient estimates for the covariates maintaining the proportional odds assumption (i.e., they are simply coefficients for an ordinal logit) and the \( \xi_j \) are the estimates for the \( z \) covariates having nonproportional odds (i.e., the effect of them varies over the scale points). With a five-category response variable, four estimates for each \( \xi \) are reported but only a single \( \beta \) is estimated for each scale point.\(^{13}\)

Finally, after the model was estimated, we inspected the interactions from the fully conditional model (i.e., a model where every covariate is assumed to vary between 2000 and 2004). Not surprisingly, many interactions were no different from 0 (for example, we have no prior expectations regarding the strength of the effect of economic evaluations in one year compared to another). In this setting, an insignificant interaction term implies the relationship between some covariate \( x \) and the response variable is no different between 2000 and 2004 samples (see Kam and Franzese 2007 for an extremely clear treatment of using interactions in this sort of context). In this case, the simpler (and appropriate) unconditional \( \beta \) is reported. The results are given in Table 2.

The first column in Table 2 gives the “unique” estimates for the 2000 sample (i.e., covariates with parameters differing across the two samples); the second column gives the “common” estimates across the samples (i.e., covariates with parameters not significantly different between 2000 and 2004); the third column gives the “unique” estimates for the 2004 sample; and the fourth column gives the estimates for the significant interaction terms. As such, this column gives the explicit test of \( \beta_{2000} = \beta_{2004} \). A negatively signed interaction term implies the coefficient for the 2004 sample is larger in scale than for the 2000 sample (or put differently, column 3 minus column 4 gives column 1.) For two covariates, moral traditionalism and group evaluations, the proportional odds assumption did not hold. For these covariates, there are four parameter estimates corresponding to cut-points \( 1, 2, 3, \) and \( 4 \) on the dependent variable. The coefficients for the nonproportional odds (i.e., the \( \xi \)) are subscripted in reference to these scale points.\(^ {14}\)

Our principle argument has been that the post-9/11 era has created a threat environment where anti-Latino sentiment should be more readily activated. The estimates for the two main covariates measuring these concepts, moral traditionalism and Hispanic trait judgements, give strong support for our argument. The estimates for the moral traditionalism scale (with the exception of the fourth cut-point estimate) are uniformly positive and significant at any conventional level. Substantively, this indicates that Anglos ascribing to morally traditional beliefs are more likely to support a restrictive immigration policy than are Anglos with less morally traditional beliefs. Moreover, as our theory would suggest, the parameter estimates for the 2004 sample are significantly different from the 2000 estimates, all of which are no different from 0. In short, immigration sentiment is explicitly connected to moral traditionalism in 2004; in 2000 there is no discernible relationship.

For the Hispanic trait judgement indicator, a similar story holds. The parameter estimate for the 2004 sample is large, significant, and substantially different from the 2000 sample. And while the traits covariate is significant at the .05 level (one tailed test) in the 2000 sample, the magnitude of the effect pales in comparison to the 2004 estimate. The implications of these results, which we discuss below, suggest that in the later period, Anglo attitudes toward immigration are now tinged with a strong acculturation component as well as with outright negative assessments of Latinos. These components are not strongly found in the pre-9/11 period.

One group-based measure that is significantly related to immigration attitudes in both samples is the “group evaluation” measure. Note the interaction between the group evaluation measure and the year dummy variable is nonsignificant, indicating that the relationship between group evaluation and attitudes toward immigration do not vary between the 2000 and 2004 samples. The results indicate the relationship between this factor and immigration attitudes seems to hold only above the scale midpoint. Substantively, this result suggests as the gap between evaluations of the ingroup (whites) vis-à-vis the outgroup (Latinos) increases, the probability of supporting more restrictive immigration levels likewise increases. To conclude there is no group-based component to immigration attitudes in the pre-9/11 era is inappropriate. Indeed, the significant finding for this measure replicates a result found in Citrin et al. (1997). Further, the significance of this indicator in both periods is suggestive of the fact that the immigration issue evokes some level of group-based judgement invariant to time; however, what is more interesting from our theoretical perspective is the

\(^{13}\)The \( \xi \) estimates reference: \( \Pr (2+ \text{ vs. } 1) \); \( \Pr (3+ \text{ vs. } 2-) \); \( \Pr (4+ \text{ vs. } 3-) \); and \( \Pr (5+ \text{ vs. } 4-) \).

\(^{14}\)We used a \( p \)-value threshold of .02 for determining nonproportionality as the Brant test is evidently anti-conservative. The \( p \)-value for these two factors was far less than .02.
absence of any acculturation fear effect and explicit anti-Latino sentiment in judgements in 2000. Turning attention to media exposure, we argued (and showed) that media coverage of immigration significantly increased nationally in the wake of 9/11. Concomitant with this rise in coverage was the increased pervasiveness of negative images of immigration and more explicitly, Latinos. Although we cannot directly measure the content of the news media survey respondents were exposed to, we can

<table>
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Data are from the 2000 and 2004 National Election Studies and from the U.S. Census Bureau. The dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigration levels and has five categories: 1= increase a lot, 2= increase a little, 3= keep the same, 4= decrease a little, 5= decrease a lot. Thus, cut-point 1 (ex: Group Evaluations 1) gives the log-odds of answering “above” the first cut-point (i.e., score = 2, 3, 4, 5) versus below the first cut=point (i.e., score = 1); cut-point 2 (ex: Group Evaluations 2) gives the log-odds of answering “above” the second cut-point (i.e., score = 3, 4, 5) versus below the second cut-point (i.e., score = 1, 2); cut-point 3 (ex: Group Evaluations 3) gives the log-odds of answering “above” third cut-point (i.e., score = 4, 5) versus responding below the third cut-point (i.e., score = 1, 2, 3); and cut-point 4 (ex: Group Evaluations 4) gives the log-odds of answering “above” fourth cut-point (i.e., score = 5) versus responding below the fourth cut-point (i.e., score = 1, 2, 3, 4). Coefficient estimates are from a partial proportional odds model. The first column of estimates in Table 2 gives the “unique” estimates for the 2000 sample (i.e., covariates with parameters differing across the two samples); the second column gives the “common” estimates across the samples (i.e., covariates with parameters not significantly different between 2000 and 2004); the third column gives the “unique” estimates for the 2004 sample; and the fourth column gives the coefficient estimates for the significant interaction terms. The moral traditionalism scale and group ratings scale exhibited non-proportionality. The entries correspond to the cut-point-specific estimates.
measure the relative attentiveness to media news sources among respondents. Our media attentiveness scale is predicted to be positively related to restrictionist attitudes in the post-9/11 era and significantly different from the estimated effect in the pre-9/11 era. Both of these predictions seem to hold strongly. The log-odds estimate for the 2004 sample is .66 and for the 2000 sample is -.05 (but no different from 0), implying the odds of responding in higher versus lower categories on the dependent variable are about two times greater for someone most attentive to the news compared to someone least attentive. As such, the findings suggest Anglos most attentive to the news are more likely to prefer more restrictive immigration than compared to Anglos least attentive to the news.

The three central factors theorized to help drive immigration attitudes in the post-9/11 era strongly do so. Acculturation fears, negative trait assessments of Hispanics, and heightened attentiveness to the media are strong components to restrictionist attitudes on the immigration issue. While some degree of group-based judgement promotes restrictionist sentiment in the pre-9/11, the threat context in the wake of 9/11 has awakened acculturation fear and anti-Latino sentiment. To provide further interpretation of these three factors, we computed the estimated probabilities for various covariate profiles. These are shown in Table 3.

In Table 3, we give the probability of responding above the scale midpoint (i.e., in the restrictionist categories) along with the 95% confidence interval around the predicted probability (in brackets) for each of the covariates of interest. The probabilities were estimated by setting the covariates to their maximum and minimum values. In the case of the three important covariates—trait judgements, moral traditionalism, and media exposure—the probabilities of scoring above the midpoint are substantially larger among 2004 respondents compared to 2000 respondents. Indeed, for the 2000 sample, the effective range over the probabilities of responding in restrictionist categories on the moral traditionalism scale and media exposure scale is essentially zero: these covariates have no relationship to restrictionist responses. For these factors in 2004, the minimum-maximum range over the probabilities is large, about .24 for moral traditionalism and .17 for media exposure.

With respect to trait assessments of Hispanics, the estimated range in probabilities from minimum to maximum values is even larger. For the 2004 sample, the point estimate on the probability of answering above the midpoint for those having the least negative judgements of Hispanics is .29. For those harboring maximal negative assessments, the estimated probability is .79 (giving a range of .50). For the 2000 sample, the range is considerably smaller, implying that while trait assessments has some relationship to Anglo attitudes in the pre-9/11 period, the relationship is mild, considerably weaker than the relationship observed in the later period.

The results suggest the factors driving restrictionist sentiments in the post-9/11 period are a mixture of acculturation fear and anti-Latino sentiment. Further, the significant relationship between media exposure and restrictionist sentiment is also consistent with our argument: the framing of the issue in negative, threatening terms coupled with the sheer increase in coverage of the issue has translated into a discernable media effect (see Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010 for a similar pattern). In our view, this gives considerable support for our theory.

As a by-product of the increased salience of immigration, we argued that preferences for heightened national security would be tethered to or bundled with restrictionist preferences on immigration. The primary impetus for this argument rested on how closely the immigration issue has been tied to security threat. As an indicator for security

| Table 3 Predicted Probability of Supporting Decreased Immigration Levels |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                        | Min         | Max         | ΔProb      | Min         | Max         | ΔProb      |                        |                        |                        |
| Hispanic Traits        | .29         | .79         | .50        | .37         | .58         | .21        |                        |                        |                        |
|                        | [.15,.43]   | [.53,.71]   |            | [.24,.50]   | [.42,.73]   |            |                        |                        |                        |
| Moral Traditionalism   | .38         | .62         | .24        | .47         | .55         | .02        |                        |                        |                        |
|                        | [.22,.54]   | [.45,.79]   |            | [.30,.64]   | [.32,.59]   |            |                        |                        |                        |
| Media Exposure         | .45         | .62         | .17        | .47         | .55         | .01        |                        |                        |                        |
|                        | [.33,.58]   | [.47,.77]   |            | [.37,.57]   | [.33,.56]   |            |                        |                        |                        |
preferences, we use a scale for defense spending; higher scores indicate a preference for increased spending on national defense. The results give mild support for this hypothesis. The estimated coefficient on defense spending for the 2004 sample is .91 and for the 2000 sample, .26. Further, the estimated effect for 2004 is significant (one-tail \( p < .05 \)), but is no different from 0 for the 2000 sample. The difference in the two coefficients, as given by the interaction term has a one-tail \( p \) -value of .11. While the relationship is not strong, it is in the predicted direction suggesting the two issues may be bundled in the later period compared to the earlier.

But what about exposure to the Latino population? A considerable body of research has shown that mere exposure to minority groups sometimes serves to heighten (or dampen) support for (or opposition to) policies benefiting minority groups (e.g., Hood and Morris 1997, 1998, see also Branton and Jones 2005). For immigration attitudes, to what extent does likely exposure to Latinos impact attitudes? To consider the possibility of a population exposure effect, we included a covariate on the percentage of foreign-born Latinos in the respondent’s state. We then constructed a binary variable coded one for southern border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) and interacted this indicator with the percent foreign-born covariate. This interaction allows us to directly assess: (1) the extent to which population characteristics relate to immigration attitudes; and (2) assess whether or not these population effects are largely occurring in the southern border states, where most points-of-entry are located and where the largest proportion of Latinos reside.

The coefficients under the heading “contextual attributes” in Table 2 provide these tests. A couple of results emerge. First, exposure effects emerge in the 2000 sample, but not in the 2004 sample. Second, to the extent these exposure effects hold, they only hold for respondents in border states, a region where immigration has been a perennial issue. For respondents in border states, the baseline level of restrictionist attitudes drops by about \(-2.09\) on the log-odds scale, but population exposure among these respondents serves to increase the log-odds of restrictionist attitudes (the odds ratio estimate suggest about 1.16 times increase). In short, we observe a regional exposure effect but an effect that disappears in the 2004 sample. This result is consistent with our theoretical expectations. After 9/11, immigration essentially became a national issue, less of a regional issue. Coverage of the issue increased dramatically across the nation generally, with the coverage being largely negative. The nationalization of the issue has served to mitigate population exposure effects to the point that by 2004, we fail to observe any relationship between population characteristics and immigration attitudes. Indeed, looking at local and state policy responses to immigration, a similar pattern emerges: some of the most draconian immigration legislation proposed occurs in locales where relatively few Latinos reside.

As far as the remaining covariates are concerned, our theory does not make any predictions about differences in the two periods. We find that the most antegalitarian Anglos are more like to prefer decreased levels of immigration than compared to the most egalitarian respondents. Similar remarks apply about individually held ideology. Extreme conservatives are more likely to prefer decreased immigration than compared to extreme liberals. With respect to economic evaluations, a small relationship is found between negative retrospective assessments and restrictionist attitudes: those who view the past as having gotten much worse are more likely to respond in restrictionist categories compared to a respondent seeing the economy as improving. Finally, with respect to demographic characteristics of respondents, both education and income are negatively related to restrictionist attitudes. These results suggest that those more well off and better educated tend to offer less extreme restrictionist responses compared to lower-income, lower-educated respondents.

To this point, we have found strong support for our theoretical expectations. But what about alternative explanations? Our theoretical argument hinges on the activation of national identity and associated ascriptive beliefs in the wake of 9/11. Unfortunately, there is no common measure of national identity employed in both the 2000 and 2004 NES. As a result, we are unable to determine the extent to which the effect of national identity on immigration attitudes changed between these two time points. In addition, we cannot discount the possibility that moral traditionalism and (to a lesser extent) the trait attributions related to individualism are merely conveying the effect of an omitted national identity measure. To address this potential problem, we estimate an additional model using only the 2004 data, which includes an indicator of national identification. Unfortunately, the questions were only asked to a subset of respondents. Of the 876 Anglos surveyed in 2004, only 437 answered these items. Though the sample size is significantly reduced, the data do allow us to determine whether the effects of traditionalism and trait attributions observed in 2004 are robust to the inclusion of
this national identification measure—thus reflecting a true value-based dimension to the immigration debate.

To measure National Identity, we use three items from the 2004 NES which ask: “When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good? How strong is your love for your country... extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong? Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally?” These items gage each respondent’s psychological sense of attachment to being an American. They reflect the more positive, or patriotic aspects of national identity rather than nativist sentiments. We coded each question so that lower values correspond to weak national attachment and higher values on the scale reflect strong national attachment. The items were combined and formed a reliable scale (alpha = .78) ranging from .08 to 1.

Table 4 presents the results for the model of attitudes on immigration in the post-9/11 era including the measure of national identity. \(^{15}\) First, note that the coefficient on the national identification covariate is positive and significant. Substantively, this indicates that individuals with a strong sense of national identity are more likely to support restrictive immigration policy than individuals with weaker national identity, which meets our expectations. The probability of a respondent preferring more restrictive immigration policy as a function of national identity is .42 greater for a respondent who exhibits the highest level of identification than compared to someone exhibiting the lowest level of identification. But, even after controlling for patriotism, moral traditionalism and Hispanic trait judgements are still positively and significantly associated with attitudes on immigration. Substantively, the results indicate that individuals ascribing to more morally traditional beliefs are more likely to support restrictive immigration policy. The probability of a respondent preferring more restrictive immigration policy as a function of moral traditionalism is .55 greater for a respondent scoring highest on the scale (most morally traditional) versus one scoring lowest (the least morally traditional).

Additionally, individuals who offer less favorable trait judgements of Hispanics are more likely to support more restrictive immigration policy than individuals that offer more favorable trait judgements of Hispanics. The probability of a respondent preferring more restrictive immigration policy as a function of Hispanic trait judgements is .66 greater for a respondent who exhibits maximally negative trait evaluations compared to someone exhibiting maximally positive trait evaluations. Further, the results indicate that the group evaluation measure is positively and significantly related to immigration attitudes. This suggests as the gap between evaluations of the whites and Latinos increases, the probability of supporting more restrictive immigration levels likewise increases. The probability of a respondent supporting more restrictive immigration policy is about .61 greater for a respondent scoring highest on the scale compared to someone scoring lowest. In sum, even after controlling for patriotism, the effect of our main covariates of interest still hold. In the

\(^{15}\)The ordinal logit estimates are consistent with non-proportional odds model estimates.
post-9/11 era, moral traditionalism and negative trait evaluations of Latinos are associated with a higher probability of supporting restrictions on immigration. Opposition to immigration is largely values-based. We now turn to a discussion of our results.16

Discussion and Conclusion

Our analysis of immigration attitudes supports the central hypotheses outlined above. Factors important in the post-9/11 period—acculturation fear, anti-Latino sentiment, and media exposure—have virtually no bearing on attitudes in the pre-9/11 period. In terms of our model, a model in which we explicitly test for differences across the two time periods, coefficients for these indicators are substantially stronger in the 2004 sample compared to the 2000 sample. Importantly, these factors are strongly related to restrictionist sentiment by 2004. Thus, not only do we observe over-time change in the factors driving restrictionist sentiment, we observe these factors having a substantial relationship on the probability a respondent will proffer restrictionist sentiment in the later period. This change is consistent with our argument regarding the heightened salience of national identity, activation of ascriptive norms, and heightened intergroup tensions following the 9/11 attacks. This new threat context, coupled with the framing of the immigration debate and prevalence of “national identity communication strategies,” has amplified hostilities towards the Latino community and preferences for stringent immigration policy following 9/11.

The threat environment induced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks focused attention on the immigration issue and by extension, on the border. So at a time when the attention of the government, the media, and the public at-large was suddenly drawn to the U.S.-Mexico border in response to threats to national security, the dramatic growth of the Latino population was coming to light. Cast in a threat environment, the immigration issue ascended the political agenda, yet all the while, the face of the issue was Latino. This climate created a context in which threats to core American values and national identity—defined in a nativist fashion post-9/11—were increasingly salient. Indeed, Huntington’s (2004) argument articulates these threats. Fear of reconquista and “Hispanization” not only underscore Huntington’s argument, but underscore the rhetoric among mainstream politicians in the wake of the 9/11 attacks with respect to immigration. This rhetoric, the framing of the issue as a value threat, a threat to national identity, we argue—and demonstrate—has awakened acculturation fears and evoked anti-Latino sentiment. This in turn has extraordinarily deleterious consequences for Latinos in the United States.17

From the perspective of social identity theory, Latinos, invariant to legal status, have become a threatening outgroup and the object of derision among many Anglos. Public policies on the issue only seek to reify this. As Johnson (2007) argues, “immigration enforcement … has had a negative impact on Mexican-American citizens, who are often presumed to be foreigners because of their physical appearance, surnames, and ancestry” (14, emphasis added). Perceptions of immigration have become inexorably linked to the Latino community, a community implicitly connected to a symbolic threat, this despite the evidence proffered by Citrin et al. (2007), who show these kinds of acculturation fears are unfounded. In this respect, mass opinion towards Latinos parallel the symbolic racism perspective, which suggests perceived violation of core American values drives animosity towards African Americans. Despite evidence to the contrary, many Anglos view the immigration issue through the lens of Huntington (2004), a lens suggesting the “American creed” is in peril, traditional Anglo-American values under siege.

References


17We believe that Arizona’s S.B. 1070 illustrates our point. Arizona’s Governor claimed the Obama administration had “simply turned a blind eye to the issues that Arizona is being overrun by illegal immigration, terrorizing the citizens.” S.B. 1070, which passed in 2010, gave state and local police the power to demand that individuals provide documentation of their legal status. Opponents assert the law will lead to racial profiling against Latinos, while supporters argue the law will increase national security. Nationwide there is vast support for the law, especially among Anglos. A 2009 CNN/Opinion Research Corp poll indicates only 34% of Anglos oppose the law, yet 49% of Anglos feel the law will lead to discrimination against Latinos.

16We should note that the media consumption indicator is in the correctly signed direction (given our hypothesis) but has wide confidence intervals. This is no doubt due in part to this estimation sample being much smaller in this model than in the full model.


Mummendey, Amelie, Andreas Klink, and Rupert Brown. 2001. "Nationalism and Patriotism: National Identification and


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